Economic Analyses Of Cooperation And Coordination Between Members In Downstream Supply Chain

The effiency of a supply chain depands on the cooperation and coordination between the member enterprises, and from the viewpoint of economic analyese, beyond the mechanism of cooperation and coordination, the development of the benefits and conflicts is the key to reform or reconstruct the supply chain. Thus viewpoint and theme of the dissertation has a very important signifance in cooperation, furthermore the effiency increase of the overall supply chain. The dissertation discusses mainly on relationship between members of downstream supply chain, based on the problems of how to coordinate the channel which consists of manufacture, and distributors,by the mathematical model,analyzes the its effects on all economic indice.Meanwhile it studys their mutual relationship with division ratio, the characteristics and condition of cooperative robustness;Furthermore, relaxing the premise of primary model, it researches the problem of "economy exterality" about improvement of individual costs;Finally, on the context of different leader in the supply chain, the dissertation probes into the change of benefits. Concretely, the invonations are as follow. It is vital to keep the relationship between them so that zero-gap juncture can be realized between; otherwise a quick transfer can't be realized even though they can do individually because of the difficulty in transferring from manufacturer to distributors. Based on their cooperative relationship, a model presents an overall analysis of its impacts on various economic characters, which are referred as retail price, wholesale price, sale volume, individual profits, channel profit, consumers' surplus as well as social welfare, etc. This work has done a creative contribution in this aspect.Based above, division coefficient is taken as the most important parameter, when further studying the cooperation between them. In a downstream supply chain with manufacturer as a leader, manufacturer could both produce and market in order to get both profits. By the game theory of Stackelberg model, the effect of profits division is analyzed. A cooperative interval is observed gradually, which leads to a ratio of division, 4:6. Sequently comparisons show that such a ratio is feasible, A stepping methodology is presented, further demonstrates cooperation and cooperation-related distribution.Not enough has been discussed in existing literature on the robustness of cooperation in supply chain. By the model mentioned above, the dissertation takes a kind of cooperative mode, buy-out marketing right for example, studies the probability of cooperation between them in long term. As cooperation increases both sides' or overall revenue, short-term cooperation will be satisfactory. However, since it leads to a gap between responsibility-right, which will frequently lead long-term cooperation to an end.Furthermore, this dissertation considers unit cost as another variable parameter, presents a deep discussion about its influence on various economic characters, and draws a series of conclusions, which have important significance in practice. Interestingly, the cost progress has same effects with relation progress. Among these conclusions, a striking one is about externality of cost. In a marketing channel with many transactions, any member manages to reduce cost in order to increase his own profit with a profit increase of any other members. Moreover, the profits are divided by a geometric progression. In order to avoid such a phenomenon, a new mechanism is designed by calculating and analyzing. Finally, previous discussions are based on the premise that the manufacturer takes as the leader in the supply chain. We now discuss the situation that buyers take as the leader. Some conclusions have been drawn simultaneously.