Game Analysis Of Venture Capital Governance

Based on the latest research of neo-institutional economics, the frontier of corporate governance is extended, and the concept of "venture capital governance" is brought forward. Game theory is applied systemically to discuss all stages of venture capital governance, consequently to guide the direction to improving the venture capital efficiency.Firstly, the theoretic frame of venture capital governance is systemically constructed. Venture capital governance is supposed to the cooperative participation of many independent resource factors offered by all kinds of stakeholders. According to the attribute of liquidity capital, venture capital governance can be comprised of three parts: governance of financing stage, governance of operating stage, and governance of exiting stage. At every stage, on the premise that factor property is clear and liquidate, incentive and restriction games of venture capital governance result in the dynamic cooperative equilibrium, which redound to the production of strong linkage effects among social funds allocation, technical innovation of small and medium-sized hi-tech enterprises, institutional innovation and other aspects.Secondly, the role of state-owned capital in all the sources of venture capital is orientated, and the significance to cultivate talented venture capitalist is emphasized, then the game relationship between liquidity capital and intellectuality capital is analyzed. In addition of explicit recompense incentive, reputation effect to some degree can limit the agent's opportunism tendency, institution limitation, contractual arrangement and governance structure also can restrain moral hazard resulted from the principal-agent relationship.Thirdly, considering the characteristic of venture enterprises, the probable problems happening in the operation of venture capital such as adverse selection and moral hazard are discussed. Game analysis show that the combined application of signaling model and screening model can evade the adverse selection for the program decision, and the grading investing and the supervisor as the contingent governance measures can efficiently reduce the moral hazard. Exemption of taxation, safeguard of intellectual property and other institutional guarantee act as important outside governance of venture capital.Finally, the applicability of several exit modes are contrasted, the many-headed and dynamic game characteristic about the setup of second-tier market in China is expounded here, then it's reasoned that we should strengthen market supervisor indispensably, and should complete the existent property transaction market to be convenient for the smooth exit of venture capital.