A Study On Management Talents' Performance Appraisals And Motivation Of Listed In China

A study on Management Talents' performance Appraisals and moeivation of listed inChina. Joint-stock company is thought as one of the mankind's greatest inventions, andhow to govern a company is also thought as a global problem as difficult as the governanceof a country. As the out standing representative in joint-stock companies, listed companyhas already become the mainstays of Chinese enterprises; Its position in global economiccompetition will determine the prospect of the security market to development of ourcountry and the vitality of the security market to some extent. A healthy corporategovernance structure is the foundation of those companies' sustainable developabledevelopment. The manager is at very important position in the governance structure oflisted company,which play with fully enthusiasm and creative is very important to thesteadily fast development of listed company, and the critical of caused the manager'senthusiasm and creative is to construct and improve a incentive constraint mechanism. Thedefects of the mechanism have caused the alienation of manager's behavior, and thenjeopardized the corporate governance and security market. It was terrible that more andmore cases had happened in reality both in China and foreign countries. Therefore, todesign a rational and scientific incentive constrain mechanism under the overall frame ofimproving the corporate governance structure becomes an important work that allenterprises in the world are devoted to, and also one of the very active research about suchmechanism on the basis of listed company governance, analyzes its historical gradualprogress and current situation, problems and defects in current incentive constraintmechanism.The problem of incentive to managers, including incentive from salary to spirit, as well as the problem of constraint, which includes constrain from outside to inside, is especially studied. Based on above analysis, some suggestions are put forward. In the course of analyzing, we have used some relevant theories in management and eccentrics. Various analytical methods are also employed, such as theory analysis and empirical analysis, historical analysis, and current situation analysis, qualitative analysis and so on. Otherwise, the article takes thousands of listed companies as original versions, which isbased on a large number of research results achieved by other people.In respect to theory analysis, the article, on one hand, systematically sums up and comments the general theories and basic conceptions about corporate governance. On the other hand, some theoretical foundations about incentive and constraint are also described and analyzed, such as theory of manage incentive, agency theory, property right theory, entrepreneur theory, human resource theory and X (low) efficiency theory, etc. Based on above analysis, this article tries to combine incentive constraint theory with corporate governance theory that establish the article's theoretical foundation.In respect to historical and current situation analysis, the article mainly set out from two aspects. One is the analysis of historical gradual progress and current situation of Chinese listed companies. The other is the history review and current situation analysis of incentive constraint mechanism in our country. Here the historical evolution and current characteristics of manager's income distribution are especially studied, and the meaning, function, necessity and urgency of reforming of incentive constraint mechanism are fully emphasized.In respect to qualitative analysis and empirical analysis, the article studies manager's salary incentive in listed companies on the basis of the annual listed data of 2001. Here mathematic methods such as regression analysis are employed. The salary incentive mainly includes two aspects, which are annual income and stock option. Results indicate that there isn't a remarkable positive-correlation relationship between annual monetary income and the company's performance and scale. Neither is the manager's share-holding obvious correlative to the indexes such as those companies' achievement and scale and so on. The article analyzes the problem, gets some reasons and gives some suggestions.Using qualitative analysis, the article on one hand discusses how to design the stock option plan, which is the design of the general principle of the stock option. On the other hand, current situation and characteristics of spirit incentive to the managers of listed company are also studied. Based on above research, the article puts forward some suggestions to improve manager's spirit incentive in listed company.Finally, this article studies the constraint mechanism from inside and outside of the listed company. The study of inside constraint mechanism is based on current laws andregulations such as company law. Here the meaning and function of the independent director system are emphasized. Outside constraint mechanism is studied, which mainly includes laws and regulation, trade standards, market competition mechanism, social environment and common-interest persons such as creditors, etc. Here, the article puts forward some constructive opinions and suggestions.