Based On The Equity Preference Assessment Research University Teacher Incentive Contract Design

In the general universities, teachers should take teaching as their central work, the design of its incentive mechanism is relatively simple, while in research universities, the teachers should allocate the limited energy to teaching and research work, the design of its incentive mechanism is relatively complex. Based on this difference, the paper hold the teachers of the research universities as research objects, use scales,questionnaire experiments to analyze the characteristics of psychological preferences and bias, then to explore these psychological preferences' influence on the design of its incentive contract. This plays an important role in stimulating and releasing the teachers'innovative knowledge, create value and improving the efficiency of its human resource utilization. At the same time,the paper integrates our cultural identity, teachers'personality test and questionnaire experiments methods to identify and evaluate teachers in a fair preference evolution and decay paths, the method can be used to analyze how to take the organizational behavior studies'procedural fairness, the information fairness and interpersonal fairness into the behavioral economics in the future, thus opening up new ways for the study on incentive problems of non-profit organizations.The paper adopts measures of normative analysis, surveys, questionnaires and models, based on the need preferences and psychological bias of research universities, especially the teachers' characteristics of fair preference, to study the efficiency of incentive contract and Optimization of teachers. First, we make use of organizational behavior'scales and the questionnaires to reveal teachers' fair preferences; then we use the experimental economics-questionnaire experiment method to reveal the research university teachers'fair preferences characteristics; thus breaking through the unity of research method of the organizational behavior and experimental economics on fair theory. Finally, by modeling ways to take fair preferences revealed by the above two methods into an utility function; Then, based on the utility function, reconstruct the principal-agent model of the research universities and teachers, and detailedly analyze the impact of fairness preferences on teacher' job pay contracts and multi-tasking incentive contracts, and make the following findings:(1) Through the system analysis of labor, needs, human capital and work task characters of teachers in research university, we find that it is very difficult to measure the output level of teachers in research university and their efforts can't be supervised. This result leads to the limitations of the application of job performance-based pay system. And the analysis of needs and psychological biases of teachers in research university conclusion that the efficiency of incentive contracts of teachers in research university is not high at present, mainly due to neglecting the individual psychological needs and biases in non-profit research university, which demonstrates that the psychological needs and biases of teachers must be considered in the teachers'contract design.(2) The equity preference of the special group of teachers in our country's research university has shown different disintegration paths in sympathy preference and jealousy preference, namely, the disintegration path shown the feature of diminishing sensitivity in sympathy preference but the feature of increasing sensitivity in jealousy preference. Moreover, the study found that this special group of teachers in our country's research university have more mind and sensitive to their inequity that at a disadvantage.(3) In the study of the influence of equity preference on the impact of job performance contract,we found that:under the conditions of equity preference, if the preference exceedsβover certain critical value, given less rewards to teacher does not necessarily lead to the lower level of efforts; if 1>β> 1/2, the decrease of rewards will lead to the increase of efforts e**>β/τe= e*; and if 0<β<1/2, the increase of rewards will lead to decrease the of efforts e**<β/τe= e*(4) In the study of the influence of equity preference on the impact of multitask incentive contracts we found that the inferences are different from conclusion of Holmstrom&Milgrom'study:①Taking the equity preference of teacher into account, the incentive of research does not necessarily reduce with the increase of the measure difficulty of teaching task. The specific relationship of them depends on the measure difficulty of research and the equity preference level of teacher.②Taking the equity preference of teacher into account, increase of research incentive does not necessarily reduce the incentive of teaching. Because there is a greater equity preference level of teacher when incentive level of teaching have not increased, such equity preference promote greater efforts have to be provided by teacher.③Taking the equity preference of teacher into account, the optimal incentive contract still provide incentive to teaching while research can not be measured. It is consistent with the results in reality.