Research On Incentive For Energy Efficiency In Existing Public Buildings

Energy consumption per meter square in existin public buildings (EPB) is very high and efficiency level of energy use in EPB is low. Improving energy efficiency in EPB is particularly important because it exhibits considerable potential for energy savings. China implements building energy efficiency (BEE) mainly through government power, that is, BEE is manily back by fund form the government, which may result in heavy burden on government. This dissertation conducts ntensive research on the incentive mechanism and policy design for the BEE in existing public sector.Based on public-goods theory and asymmetric-information theory, the quasi-public goods attribute of the BEE and information asymmetry is analyzed. The quasi-public goods, asymmetric-information, lower energy price, and imperfect capital market lead to the ineffectiveness of market in BEE, which results in the efficiency loss and insufficient voluntary supplies. In order to let the market works in BEE, incentive system should be constructed, which may fully display the role of the government functions in the macroeconomic control, and fully display the role of the supervision by society. Based on the analysis of polic instruments in BEE, it is raised that incentive is a crucial policy instrument to promote BEE in China.Energy-efficiency supervision systems for energy management in large public buildings are set up in China. However, existing public building energy efficiency is confronted with many barriers, and main bodies of existing public buildings are not active in the energy efficiency.Interaction among incentive subjects of EPB is analyzed and game between central government and local government, game between government and owner, and game between owner and owner are set up. Principal-agent relation in EPB energy efficiency is also analyzed in this dissertation and the principal-agent incentive model of government-owner is set up. Based on intensive research on the mechanism of incentive for energy efficiency in existing public buildings, incentive mix model is set up. By using this model, the framework of incentive system for EPB which includes energy-efficiency supervision and energy-efficiency retrofits is designed. EPB is divided into three types:government office buildings, buildings financed partially by budgetary funds, and commercial buildings, and incentive policy for each type is designed.Finally, research products are used in the applied analysis of incentive system for EPB in Shenzhen. BEE in the public sector in Shenzhen changed from partial exploration to start full swng under deployment. However, incentive for energy-efficiency of EPB is mainly supported by government budgets and market-oriented incentive is not set up, which belongs to the first stage of the incetive mix model. Based on the analysis of incentive policy in Shenzhen and research products of this dissertation, recommendations are proposed.Intensive researche on incentive system for EPB may change development model of BEE from government-oriented to market-oriented, which may strengthen the effectiveness of market forces in the energy-efficiency retrofits.