| Currently, under the circumstance of technology licensing and independent innovation coexisting, domestic firm's independent innovation has a bottleneck problem of lack of R&D investment. It means that it is essential to manage to raise domestic firm's independent innovation investment level under being licensed. Therefore, this dissertation studies ex ante licensee's independent innovation investment decisions for finding ways of making firm's independent innovation investment under being ex ante licensed increase and get more profits from such increase.This dissertation regards firm mainly adopting low cost competitive strategy (low cost competing firm) as subject investigated and focuses on firm's incremental cost-reducing process innovation. With the underlying assumption that there is a duopoly, ex ante licensee's independent innovation investment decisions are studied by considering influences of the particular factors, which occur in various stages of the process including before ex ante licensing between firms, ex ante licensing, after ex ante licensing, firm's R&D and R&D commercialization in sequence. As a result, the intrinsic regularity of the change of ex ante licensee's independent innovation investment size is shown. On this basis, it can be known how can make domestic firm's independent innovation investment under being ex ante licensed increase and get more profits from such increase. Research adopts the game theory and builds a two or three stages non-cooperation game model of R&D race under ex ante licensing to analyze firms'R&D race under technology licensing, then adopts typical case study method to link up the research results with domestic firms'actual state of the particular factors of various stages mentioned above and their practical independent innovation investment after accepting patent licensing to inspect the validity of the research results.Research results are: under particular factors of before ex ante licensing, the higher the level of firm's non-infringing imitation before its being licensed is, the fewer ex ante licensee's equilibrium investment on independent innovation is, but the more its expected profits are; ex ante licensee's equilibrium independent innovation investment is monotone increasing along with reduction of its technological base level before ex ante licensing, and its expected profits are monotone decreasing along with that; its equilibrium independent innovation investment and its expected profits are both monotone decreasing along with increase of capital opportunity cost, and the smaller capital opportunity cost is, the larger its marginal influences mentioned above are. under particular factors of ex ante licensing, ex ante licensee's equilibrium independent innovation investment is linearly degressive along with increase of its ex ante licensing costs, and its expected profits are linearly steadily increasing along with that; ex ante licensee's equilibrium independent innovation investment and its expected profits are both linearly degressive along with increase of rival's ex post licensing costs; the higher royalty rate is, namely the smaller the licensee's share of the gains from licensing is, then the more ex ante licensee's equilibrium investment on independent innovation is, but the fewer expected profits are. under particular factors of after ex ante licensing and firm's R&D, ex ante licensee's increased R&D accumulation before its being licensed or reduced tacit degree of the licensed technology will increase ex ante licensee's equilibrium independent innovation investment and its expected profits. In addition, when ex ante licensee's R&D accumulation is relatively small or tacit degree of the licensed technology is relatively high, their marginal influences mentioned above are larger; the lower ex ante licensee's R&D cost efficiency is, the fewer its equilibrium investment on independent innovation is, but such influence becomes smaller and smaller, and the lower its expected profits are. under particular factors of R&D commercialization, ex ante licensee's equilibrium independent innovation investment under strategic delegation may be different from that under no strategic delegation, and the nature and size of such difference depend on the relatively advanced degree of ex ante licensed technology and the absolute level of successful independent innovation; the smaller the level of product differentiation is, the fewer ex ante licensee's equilibrium investment on independent innovation and its expected profits are; ex ante licensee's equilibrium independent innovation investment is monotone increasing along with increase of patent protection intensity, and its expected profits are mainly monotone decreasing along with that; ex ante licensee's equilibrium independent innovation investment and its expected profits are both monotone increasing along with increase of market size. The expection of these results is essentially consistent with domestic firms'practices.According to the research results, the technological, organizational, institutional and market approaches of making firm's independent innovation investment under being ex ante licensed increase and firm get more profits from such increase are known, such as increasing firm's sustainable innovation ability, reducing capital opportunity cost, reducing rival's ex post licensing costs, increasing firm's R&D accumulation and reducing the tacit degree of the licensed technology to increase firm's absorptive capacity to licensed technology, increasing firm's R&D cost efficiency, establishing and completing the modern firm's governance mechanism, increasing product differentiation and strengthening patent protection for industries with larger market size.Associated with the above findings some policy recommendations are as follows: increasing firm's sustainable innovation ability by strengthening finacial and taxes aid to those firms which technology base are weak, product market size are small and profit margin are low; reducing the licensing costs by conducting innovative system design of technology transaction at macroscopical level and microcosmic level; increasing firm's absorptive capacity to licensed technology through increasing firm's R&D accumulation and reducing the tacit degree of the licensed technology by adopting some relevant preferential policies on finance and taxation and financing mechanism to support ex ante licensee's independent innovation, encouraging and supporting firms, especially the large scale firms, to set up and complete technology center for forming a relatively robust technology development system and innovation ability at key and integrated technologies of the predominate product as quickly as possible, supporting and expanding exports of goods and technical services with independent intellectual property rights and independent brands for stimulating firms to cultivate independent innovation ability, raising the insurance industry's role of promoting firms to conduct R&D, encouraging firms and research institutes to jointly set up engineering technology research center, and encouraging firms to increase investment in digestion and absorption of the imported technologies by means of preferential taxation and increasing national fiscal expenditure; increasing firm's cost efficiency by strengthening talented person cultivating and motivating, cooperation among firms, universities and research institution, and encouraging firms to give new technology with less difficulties and funds demand priority to be developed; optimizing firm's governance structure by further completing the modern firm's commitment-agency system; achieving product differentiation by encouraging firms to carry out business innovation while conducting technology innovation and increase customer's perceived value; patent protection by providing less tight patent protection for industries with smaller market size or uncompleted market development having relatively small market size while strengthening patent protection for industries with larger market size.
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