Stochastic Catastrophe Analysis On Evolutions Of The Business Organizations

There are many discrete catastrophes, which are hard to forecast, apart from continuous gradual behaviors in the evolutionary process of the perturbed business organizations by stochastic disturbance. Compared with managing the latter, predicting and controlling catastrophes are more challenging, so we discuss the caststrophes laws of the evolutionary process of the business under some disturbances by means of stochastic catastrophe theory (SCT).It is not fully reasonable to apply elementary catastrophe theory to analyzing the castastrophes of business chatacterized by uncertainty, so we introduce a new tool:SCT. We elaborate its fundamentals, containing:object (Ito stochastic differential equations), theme (the catastrophe laws of a stochastic system), tools (stochastic potential function, limited probability density function, modes and stochastic bifurcation and so on), and using methods (one is directly analyzing the dynamics of the system described by Ito stochastic differential equations, and the other one is using sepcialized statistic fitting theory to systems characterized by catastrophes, and obtain the catastrophe models to be processed).Macroscopically, we let strategic alliance's discrete changes from stable cooperation to unplanned breaking up as the study theme. The evolutionary process of partners' strategies is considered by evolutionary game theory perspective. According to behavioral operations theory, and the fairness perception utility is introduced into the payoff matrix to encourage trust between alliances. Meanwhile, the Gauss white noise is introduced to demonstrate the random disturbance in the process. It is found that the fairness perception utility play an important role in choosing strategies. The phenomenon that the strategic alliances change from stable cooperation to unplanned breaking up can be explained by two methods as follows:one is that when the parameters are in the biruraction zone, the strategic alliances will suffer turbulent sudden jumps from stable cooperation to unplanned breaking up due to external stochastic disturbance; the other one is that when the parameters are crossing the edge of the biruraction zone, the strategic alliances will undergo structural catastrophes from stable cooperation to unplanned breaking up due to self organization. Intermediately, this study deems knowledge sharing behaviors in a team as the theme. Knowledge is core resource, and is dormant, so we introduce supervising mechanism and award-punishment mechanism. An evolutionary game model on knowledge sharing within a team is developed, and the Gaussian White noise is introduced to show the disturbance in this game. We use stochastic catastrophe theory to analyze the discrete changes of the team's behaviors according to the continuous changes of model parameters. It is indicated that the catastrophe mechanism of knowledge sharing deponds on the virtual variables such as knowledge level, the cost of cooperation, the loss of sharing knowledge, the award and punishment of non-sharing knowledge, the extent of supervising and the dividing of punishment, rather than the immaterial variables such as cooperation efficiency, learning cost, the ability of absorbing new knowledge and the degree to which the knowledge can be shared. It is the virtual varibles that determine the mechanisms of the discrete changes from sharing knowledge to not.Microscopically, we choose the process of fulfillment—breach of organization commitment and psychological contract as the theme. It is confirmed that according to empirical research, the evolutionary process of both organization commitment and psychological contract are characterized by nonlinear catastrophes which are particular to cusp catastrophe models. Thus it is reasonable to describe the dynamics of them by stochastic cusp catastrophe models. In order to understand the evolutionary process of the two systems, we respectively use personality and organizational context, job satisfaction and organizational support as independent control variables, and by means of cuspfit software fit the real data to cusp catastrophe models. It is demonstrated that organizational context as a normal factor and personality as a bifurcation factor play important roles in nonlinear catastrophic mechanism of psychological contract, while job satisfaction as a normal factor and organizational support as a bifurcation factor play important roles in nonlinear catastrophic mechanism of organization commitment. The existence of hysteresis implies that once organization commitment and psychological contract suffer breaches they could not easily be repaired.