The Study Of Default Risk In Supply Chain

Being prevailing among international corporations, supply chain (SC) management becomes an advanced management pattern. Recently, paroxysmal incidents and credit sale between corporations in SC are more and more, which increase default risk in SC, and the harm aroused by default risk is more serious.The forming reasons of default risk in SC are analyzed qualitatively. Microcosmic mechanism of default risk originating and controlling is analyzed using the game theory and information economics. Firstly, the complete information static and dynamic game model and incomplete information static and dynamic game model of credit sale process are established. Second, default risk originating is studied from the point of view of information economy, guaranty agreement is designed for credit action, and an implicit incentive mechanism is discussed by a reputation model of firm.The effect of default risk to SC is analyzed qualitatively. A dualistic frame composed of a supplier and a retailer is taken as the study object, the effect of default risk to firms and SC is analyzed quantificationally based that the delivery process between the supplier and retailer is Stackelberg game. And relevant cases are analyzed. The effect of default risk to the cooperative partners' relation and the stability of SC are analyzed by the satisfaction degree model on supplier and retailer.First, evaluating indexes system of cooperative partner selection for supply chain is summarized, many important indexes are given to distinguish and prevent default risk. Second, merits and defects of methods of cooperative partner selection for supply chain are analyzed. Because of grey characteristics of the system studied, and based on the old data of defaulted firms, the representative default firm is constituted, and a new method to choose supply chain cooperative partners is given using gray correlation degree based on the old data of defaulted firms, and then a case is analyzed.First, the function of information share among enterprises in SC to prevent and control default risk is analyzed. Second, the importance of incentive to information share is showed by the game theory. Thirdly, incentive mechanism based on information share is designed, and several incentive patterns are given. Fourthly,approach of carrying out information share is analyzed, such as communicating firm, stock control, intensifying intercommunion and so on. Finally, patterns of information share matching to different information are analyzed.Supposing there is linear relation between default and market risk, the reduced pricing models of standard and forward credit default swaps are constructed, and the pricing models is used in controlling default risk of supply chain.Probability and harm of default risk in supply chain are large, but we can distinguish, prevent and control effectively default risk.