The Research Of The Diffusion And Configuration Of The Residual Right In The Enterprise

From the reform of the State-Owned enterprises in China (SOEC), thirty years passed, the govermance has made great progress. Because of that, the Chinese economy has been increasing fastly and steadily. Many of foreign economists have that as the myth in developing countries. So the fact has made those see about and analysis the history of the reform of SOEC. They hope to find out the reasons of SOEC. The author of this thesis also began to pay attention to the phenomenon after inspired by the warm of economist's research and the actual situation. When he started from the ownership of enterprise, the author found a question: study the ownership and residual rights were the same. So he intended to study the problem of the residual rights, but it was difficult for one to understand any aspect of that. So the author, startting from the origin of the residual rights, then studying the changes and configuration of that, reviewing the reform course of SOEC and studying the configuration of the residual rights of the Chinese Holding companies, verificate the conclusion mentioned in the former.The so-called residual right is the right related the residual of enterprise, and it involes the residual claims and the residual right of control. The object of the former is the productive residual, the later's is the assets. They are the contents of the residual rights. The book writed by AIfred D.Chandler, named"the visible hand"not only described the occupational manager's role but also provide the proof the changes of residual rights in the course of American enterprises from 19 century to 20 century. According to that, the author made a conclusion vaguely that the residual rights were diffusing from the owner of physical capital to human capital. The author thought that it was present. The changes of residual rights are affected by perfect level of factor markets, the level of specificity of assets and contribution. The author generated the three aspects as the relative importance of factor, and he thought that was the fundamental reason that leaded to the changes of residual rights of enterprise.But the author emphaszes that the relative importance of factor may be different from the bargining ability because there is difference between their influence factors. First, the base of the bargining ability is the incomplete market, that is the incomplete information. The contract signed based on complete information is usually short-term one, but lang-term. The nature of enterprise is lang-term contract, which will last the time of uncertain bankcruptcy. The lang-term one will make the ownership sign the contract not based on the complete information, that can not determine whether the contract is signed or not. Secondly, when they discussed the complete market, they emphasized that the complete market means the specificity of any asset would be zero specially. The view produce in the misunderstanding on the specificity of asset. Dispit of the market is complete or not, factor will have the specificity of asset because that is the characteristic of demand. So the relative importance of factor is a wider conception. If the bargining ability is the complete level of factor market, the author will have it as the part of the relative importance of factor.Such being the case, it will be the ideal way to configure the residual right of enterprise based on the relative importance of factor. So the number of the residual right that some property right main body should have will equal to the number of all of residual rights that is correspondent to factors. Now, the ownership of physical capital has the superiority in the relative importance of factor. The relative importance of managial human capital is very low, and the one of labor is lower. That can not diny the relative importance of human capital. But the fact is that there is obvious situation of neglecting that, so a problem produces which is that residual right is configured wrongly.The author thinks that if wanting to solute this problem, the governmance should face the phenomenon, then there will be good effect by takeing the measure from the residual claims and residual right of control. In the aspect of the residual claims, The author suggests that the govermance should take the measures in four aspects: First, perfecting the factor markets, especially the manager market; secondly, further more perfecting the internal monitoring system; thirdly,giving some of the residual claims to the human capital that is configured wrongly; forthly, increasing the fluidity of the residual claims. In the aspect of the residual right of control,the author thinks that the configuration of the residual right of control is transforming gradually from single model to sharing. In the sharing model, thecumulative voting of stock is the most universal. But that can not restraint the large stockholder efficiently. The model of jerk participating manage in Japan will atone the shortcoming to a certain extent. But the model needs some the conditions: lifelong employment system and year labor sequence system. So the third sharing model, staff representative system, will be efficient. The author thinks when there are restraintance that factor ownership has different risk by chance in the residual claims and the residual right of control and that the self of factor is limited, in addition, the number of the ownership of factor is limited, the residual right of control is usually given to the one who have the high risk and whose factor has the great role. That provides a basic of theory for establish the staff representative in board of supervisors and board of directors. The author thinks this kind of system will not only make jerks participate the management, but also can victory the problem that the jerk can not participate the decision-making because the low level of automation leads to large scale of jerks to a certain extent.