The U.S. Nuclear Non-proliferation Policy During The Transformation Period Of The Cold War (1969-1976)

The international Cold War structure was transformed from the late1960s to themiddle of1970s, during which time the U.S. global strategy was at a turning point andthe international nuclear non-proliferation regime was in the critical period ofdevelopment. This dissertation will examine the nuclear non-proliferation policy of theUnited States during this period, and take Taiwan, Israel and India as case studies basedon the newly declassified official archives of the U.S. government.The argument of this dissertation is that the nuclear proliferation is the origin andmotivation of the nuclear non-proliferation policy, and the latter is a natural response tothe former. It is a process of mutual shaping and mutual influencing. The U.S. nuclearnon-proliferation policy, therefore, is the result of a complicated game between theUnited States and the potential nuclear proliferator, which is influenced not only by itsown nuclear intelligence and perception, domestic politics, decision making process andbilateral relations, but also by the international Cold War structure and the proliferator’snuclear capability and intentions. Thus, in the process of their games, the United States isnot always the advantaged and the winner.Two schools of thought in international politics, idealism and realism, havecontinued to influence the U.S. nuclear non-proliferation policy since the end of WorldWar II. Among other things, the impact of realism school reached its peak when RichardNixon and Henry Kissinger made their grand strategy to transform the Cold War. Duringthis period, the United States nuclear non-proliferation policy extended itself from atraditional foreign policy issue to the national security strategy field, redefining thenuclear non-proliferation policy per se to some extent. Ideally, the United States did notwant any other country of the international community except itself to possess nuclearweapons to keep its nuclear hegemony all the time, but this is impossible in reality. Thepurpose of the U.S. nuclear non-proliferation policy is to prevent other states to developtheir own nuclear weapons, but there is always a gap between this purpose and its policytool. In such a case, the U.S. administration often takes pragmatism or opportunismattitude. Accepting the reality of nuclear proliferation, it will try to minimize the negative effects by even trying to do something to repair the relations with the nuclear proliferator.Policy as such should not be taken as a reflection of double standard, and it looks morelike a policy result rather than a policy choice.This dissertation includes seven parts: the Foreword will present the value of thestudy, the research methods and the academic reviews; Chapter One will examine someWestern theories of international politics and their approaches to the subject matter, andthen set up my own research variables and hypothesis; Chapter Two will review thehistory of the U.S. nuclear non-proliferation policy practice before1969, and define theCold War Transition and its implication to non-proliferation activities. Chapter Three,Chapter Four and Chapter Five are case studies of U.S. nuclear non-proliferation policytoward Taiwan, Israel and India. In each case, the interactions between the United Statesand the potential nuclear proliferator will be explored, including the motives andcharacteristics of their policies. The Last Part is the conclusion.