A Study Of Public Right Rent-Seeking Based On Contest Theory

In recent years, the problem of power corruption in China has become more and more serious. Power corruption has made social contradictions increasingly acute, put the Government’s credibility to the test and sully the purity of the Communist Party, which will affect the country’s long-term stability. The benefits of public rights rent-seeking are the driving forces of power corruption. To maintain the stability of the State and to create a fair, just and open social environment, we must take the corresponding countermeasures to eliminate power corruption. Therefore, the study on public rights rent-seeking contest can provide the policy guidance for designing the mechanism to prevent public rights rent-seeking, which is of great theoretical significance and practical value.Based on contest theory, the public rights rent-seeking contest model is constructed to study the running efficiency of oversight mechanism, the oversight cost-to-income ratio and the impact of the rent seeker punishment level on public rights rent-seeking contest balance. In addition, the related nature of public rights rent-seeking contest, the incomplete information public rights rent-seeking contest, the existent subcontract incomplete information public rights rent-seeking contest and the balance of the investment public rights rent-seeking contest are explored.First of all, a general model of public rights rent-seeking contest is established to prove the existence of Nash equilibrium of public rights rent-seeking contest model and draws a general conclusion of public rights rent-seeking contest. The conclusion shows that:The contestant’s effort level is related to the awards granted by the supervisor but has nothing to with the rent seeker’s behavior. The punishment for the rent seeker is not the more severe the better but should be maintained within a reasonable range. When the punishment reaches a certain degree, the more severe punishment for the rent seeker will make the supervisor lazier, whereas the change of the wasted social resources is indeterminate. By increasing the awards for the supervisor and improving the running efficiency of the mechanism and the information transparency, the disclosure probability of rent-seeking behavior will be increased. Reducing the oversight costs can reduce the rent seeker’s the probability of selecting and accepting the contestants’effort level and then reduce the waste of social resources.Secondly, the related nature of public rights rent-seeking contest is analyzed and proves that:If public rights rent-seeking contest game is symmetric, and the punishment for the rent seeker is proportional to the total rent-seeking effort level and the punishment coefficient is less than oversight revenue costs, the public rights rent-seeking contest game will merely exist the only and symmetric Nash equilibrium, and the public rights rent-seeking contest will meet the linear equivalence theorem. If public rights rent-seeking contest game is symmetric and in balance, and the contestant attains the maximum value of another contestant’s reaction function, the public rights rent-seeking contest will meet the dynamic consistency.Then the incomplete information public rights rent-seeking contest is explored, analyzing the impact of valuation differences as well as the rent-seeking type on public rights rent-seeking contest balance. The conclusion indicates that:The impact of the supervisor on the high type contestant is greater than the low type contestant, making the situation of low type contestant better, and high type contestant somewhat worse, that is, the supervisor can eliminate the capacity differences of different contestants to some degree. The stronger the positive correlation of the contestant is, the fiercer the rent-seeking competition becomes, and vice versa.Furthermore, the existent subcontract incomplete information public rights rent-seeking contest is analyzed. The conclusion shows that:the high type contestant may pay much more or less efforts than the low type contestant; the effort level differences of the two types of contestants are proportional to their type correlation, that is, the stronger the positive correlation of contestant type is, the larger the efforts level differences paid by different type contestants will become.Finally, the investment public rights rent-seeking contest is investigated. The conclusion shows that:Although the contestants still make investments to improve their rent-seeking ability, the investments will not increase or reduce the contestants’ rent-seeking effort level. That is to say, in terms of public rights rent-seeking, adding some evaluation indicators which can reflect the contestants’capacity and designing more complex programs can increase the contestants’rent-seeking ability, but can not reduce their rent-seeking efforts. Therefore, in designing the mechanism to prevent public rights rent-seeking, it is not desirable to reduce the contestants’rent-seeking effort level by adding the evaluation indicators.The last part of the dissertation makes a summary and raises some issues for further research.