Rent-seeking, Property-rights And Economic Performance

This thesis consists of three parts. In the first part, The main achievements of rent-seeking are reviewed and the basic concepts in the thesis are presented. In the second part, in order to answer the question why people choose rent-seeking and to judge the welfare caused by rent-seeking, the relationship among "property-rights" ,"rent-seeking" and "government regulation" will be analyzed. In the three parts, I try to apply the theoretical frame and analytical method developed above to the problems of rent-seeking in Nationalization Corporation reformation.Through the theoretical analysis and real case provement, following viewpoints are presented.( 1 ) The cause of rent-seeking lies in government control and intervention of the private trade of property right. Beyond that, the generation of rent-seeking is related closely to the form and conduction method of government intervention to the private trade of property right. ( 2 ) In a distorted system environment, and in the initial state of the low disposition efficiency of property right, rent-seeking possiblilly becomes the campaign that has indirect social productivity. However, when beneficial groups that override on all established social regular restraints were existing in society, the system changes triggered by the campaign of " groups rent-seeking " could bring the disastrous consequences for entire society.( 3 ) The massvely appearances of rent-seeking campaign during state-owend enterprise reform are due to the market economics not yet formed thoroughly, government has not quited . But the deeper reason lies in that during state-owend enterprise economic reform which advances gradually, government uses administrative methods instead of formal legal ways for...