Evolution Beneath Crisis:Research On The Tactics And Training Of Late Qing’s Army Discussing Center On Xiangjun, Huaijun And Xinjianlujun

In the16-17th centuries, armies of China and Western world both had used many tubular powder weapons in battle. But their military developments had a different prospect from then on. In order to maximize the power of weapons, western armies began to measure the most efficient usage method by rule and line. Those efforts made their ways of combat and training not the subjective thoughts which on the base of experience any more, and become measurable and examinable. As a result, the power of powder weapons were more and more lethal that cavalry could rule the battle no more. Although the powder weapons’ forms of the armies of Ming Dynasty were varied as well as the fighting method, none of them were the outcome by analysis and demonstration. Even though the methods of combat and training which were created by excellent generals such as Yu Dayou or Qi Jiguang had some practical value, they were also the creation of these generals’ talents. Because those methods were not closely examined and standardized, they couldn’t be improved and remained at the stage of experience. The history record of battles between Ming Dynasty and Manchu indicates that the former army has used the powder weapons in a chaotic and inefficient way. That is a reason why horse and bow overwhelmed firing guns easily. But the Qing Dynasty inherited the methods of battle and training, so it couldn’t develop a scientific tactics fitting for the powder weapons either. It seems that the limitation of traditional mode of thinking may be one of the reasons why Chinese armies’ tactics and training level have fallen behind.This limitation still affected the reform of Xiangjun. The reform inspired, by the sufferings both inside and outside, was a reflection of the "Jing Shi"(serving to resolve real problems) thought. So the organization, tactics and training of Xiangjun inherited from the army of Qi Jiguang followed the practical principles and abandoned the good-looking but useless methods of the Green Banners. After practices in the civil war, they have further improvements and recreations that influencing deeply. So the reform of Xiangjun can be seen as a renewal of Chinese Army which can be a foundation stone of modernization. However, it was not the beginning of modernization because everything still stayed in subjective intuition and experience as before. From the battle records, it can be seen that tactics used depended upon each general’s preference instead of standard regulations which came from the strict analysis and accurate calculation. Therefore, the reform of Xiangjun can not be an update in spite of its practical value.Huaijun may be a clearer example. The need of warfare forced it to accept western weapons, tactics and training methods. Campaigns in Jiangsu province revealed that changes occurred in Huaijun. A tactic system mixing Chinese and Western ways had been developed. Huaijun became the first army that every arm of the services combated in coordination with each other using modern riffles and guns. But when the civil war was over, the experience gained from the battlefield hadn’t been studied scientifically that it still couldn’t refine combat and training regulations from warfare experience. On the contrary, generals in Huaijun created their own way for tactic training respectively without analysis, demonstration or experiments. So its training became good-looking but useless as before. Besides, the traditional mode of thinking even prevented people from a truly understanding with the western ideology of military. Zhou Shengchuan, the commander of Sheng Jun, was typical. He transformed new ideas or opinions into a form of meaning with which he was familiar very naturally. Because of this recognizing pattern, his "western methods" of training Sheng Jun were misunderstood and misinterpreted at very first. As a result, the way of building and training took by him was dated. It is not hard to conclude that the traditional mode of thinking may be one of the key reasons why the Huaijun can not achieve its modernization.The crisis awareness aroused by the defeat of Sino-Japanese War forced people to seek more effective measures. It was the beginning that Chinese people tried to learn about western knowledge or skill by its own logic. This change of attitude was more obvious. Some scholars started to criticize the traditional military theory unpractical. Meanwhile, these people intended to introduce the whole mode of training used by western armies. Yuan Shikai was the very one of them. He obtained an opportunity to train a new organized army called Xinjianlujun that the reform could become a reality from opinions. Consequently, this troop was very different from the Huaijun. Its officers had done considerable research on western military knowledge that the management became regularized and the training developed towards standardization. And these changes of Xinjianlujun implied the transformation of thinking method. Chinese army for the first time tried to study and resolve military affair by ration instead of experience, which was the key to the military modernization. And finally the army of Late Qing China turned to the proper direction that required by modern warfare.Thus it can be seen that the crisis of nation inspired an eager pursue to practical methods. So the aggravation of crisis had driven Late Qing’s army off their original path. It is thus clear that the refonn of tactics and training of the Late Qing’s army is a thinking model transformation.Therefore, passive and exogenous are its unavoidable features which make it a very hard and long process. It reminds us that the military modernization should beging from the very root so that it can be in progress naturally. Otherwise, this passive reform leaded people to focus on function only at that time so that function became a main benchmark of judgment. Accordingly, the traditional culture with its moral norm was despised gradually because of its useless for reality. This may be a reason why the army has improved, but the morality declined steadily. Perhaps, this problem is a miniature of Late Qing’s modernization for whole.