The Game Theoretical Research Of Local Power-interest Groups And Its Related Subjects

Local governments are the inventors of China’s economic growth. Its achievement has been widely acknowledged and accepted by academic circles. However, with the rapid development of economics in China, local governments’ issues also have been exposed apparently. In recent years, although the academic circles increasingly pay attention to it, the substantive theory innovation is rare, while there are defects more or less in the original theory analysis about the problems. A deep thought is required to us. In fact, as the policy enforcement agencies, because of its operation in the specific administrative act of the direct reality, it inevitably has the inextricable relationship with private enterprises as the main body of market, and based on the pursuit of their respective interest coupling, both eventually formed the middle which different from the central government and individuals and other groups "power-interest" which privileges as a whole, it has an ineligible effect on effective implementation of the policy and the balanced development of the market. This paper from the macroscopic angle of the institutional change of subject, tries to related subject in the theory of classical decomposition, restructures the original theory with China’s situation to the local power-interest groups hypothesis, when to study, then tries to put embeddedness into it, the structural analysis provides theory support for local interest groups hypothesis of integrity and applies the theory to the place in the category of the analysis of the relationship between government and private enterprises, and then puts forward to enterprise hypothesis at micro level policy, tries to analyze game relation impacts the interest and decisions on both sides between the central government and local government, local government and private enterprises, policy enterprises and common interest so as to clarify the actual behavior of local governments and private enterprise guidance, understand them in the form of case analysis, provide new ideas with analyzing and solving the real economic problems. To complete the analysis, this article is divided into the following several parts:Firstly, the article respectively generalizes the research background, research significance, research ideas, research innovation points and basic concepts in the form of introduction, grasps the article overall from the macroscopic level, clears the value of study and then lays the foundation of the progress in below.The second part is the literature review and the theoretical basis, mainly making the sorting of detail for the research results and the research ideas of the scholars both at home and abroad, pointing out the blank of current research, also elaborating the main theory, including institutional change theory, embeddedness, principal agent theory and game theory etc, finding the basis theories for the paper below.The third part proposes "Local interest groups in the hypothesis" and analyzes its status in institutional change through the re classification of the main body of institutional change, along the logic of the context of "government division, there classification of the main body of institutional change, institutional change (possibility) and its main body reaction", interprets the formation mechanism of local interest groups and its role and status in the institutional change. Concentrated reflection as follows:First of all, it points out the irrationality that the government as a whole as the main body of institutional change individual because of the difference among the main body, all based on the analysis of power, behavior, interest and level differences between the central and local government. Concentrated reflection as follows:First of all, it points out the irrationality that the government as a whole as the main body of institutional change individual because of the difference among the main body, all based on the analysis of power, behavior, interest and level differences between the central and local government. Secondly, under the premise of the division of central and local governments, dislocating and matching analysis on each main body of the institutional change, completing the description of coupling interest between the local governments and interest groups and distinguishing the resistance, both have the possibility and necessity as the same subject in the process of institutional change. Thirdly, respectively putting local power-interest groups into analysis on mandatory and induced institutional change, analyzing the reaction in the various subjects when arranging the possibility of all kinds interest of institutional change, proposing local power-interest groups in the mandatory and induced institutional change has too much power, in the process of mandatory institutional change, local power-interest groups can make use of local governments’"selective execution" to modificate system design which does not use its own system, or on its own duality:The "power-interest". Adding to pressure on the corresponding system of the central government, protecting the interest of the local power-interest groups, in the actual the induced institutional change as the "First Action Groups" is precisely interest of the local power-interest groups. Finally, after completing the above analysis, local power-interest groups actually exist as the actual leaders of institutional change.The fourth part conducts the boundary and applicability of local power-interest groups, expanding the discussion around "the mechanism and interaction of the government and the enterprise decision-making, the embedded relationship between enterprises and local government, the scope analysis of the local power-interest groups, the applicability of the border for the local power-interest groups and the policy enterprise", teasing the previous studies in the aspects of the government and enterprise decision-making mechanism, illustrating the interaction relationship between government and enterprise, analytically embedding the intrinsic mechanism between government and the main body of enterprises, we conclude there are obvious relational embedding and structural embedding between government and enterprises, and they interact each other. On the basis of clearing the relationship between the government and enterprises, defining the boundary of the local power-interest groups through the local power-interest groups of relevant subject division, the policy enterprise is the boundary of local power-interest groups. So analyzing and determining the concept and mechanism of the policy enterprise has becoming the premise of policy enterprise, also becoming the suitability methods of dividing the boundaries of local power-interest groups.In The fifth part, the game method is used to match and analyze the local power-interest groups related subjects, including the power game between the central and local government, the cooperative game between local government and enterprises, the evolution of the game in local individual enterprises. Firstly, in the power game between the central government and local government, the central government uses the incentive mechanism and corresponding policy guidance as the control means by analyzing the "commissioned-agent relationship". However, local governments achieve the dominance in the game through selective executed operation and information advantage in both sides. Secondly, in the cooperative game between local government and enterprises analyzing both options and other policies, it comes to the conclusion that local governments and enterprises based on respective interest requirement, eventually jointly choose cooperation as the final steady state results of game. Thirdly, in the evolutionary game of microcosmic enterprises, micro enterprises are more inclined to assist with the government through different enterprises choose whether cooperation with enterprise cost, profit and market competitiveness, furthermore, analyzing the behavior of local governments to choose partners, it is concluded that companies meet the demand cooperation of local government through their own adjustment implementation, achieving the incentives of cooperation with government. Through game analysis of local power-interest groups related subjects, logically concludes both local governments and enterprises have the cooperation intention due to the coupling of interest.The sixth part selecting Suntech Power Co., Ltd. as the case and analyzing the empirical case of the policy enterprise. Through the analysis we confirm suntech meet the policy enterprise characteristics and the case meet the requirements of this article, through the simple case description this paper expounds the suntech development of sharping rise and speeding die. Firstly it expounds the local government to the enterprise of "helping hand": In the process of establishment of the enterprise local government offers financing, subsidies and other support, in the process of enterprise development, the local government continuously broadens the financing channels of the enterprise, helps enterprise ride out the storm. And then sets out the specific situation of the enterprise expansion behavior, analyses reasons for government expansion, proves that in the process of operation the policy enterprise expands capacity and the scale in order to ensure the interest of local government. The combination of strategic emerging industries, through case it proves the development, management mode and characteristics of the policy enterprise and provides evidence of support for the presence of policy business.The seventh part is the conclusion, policy suggestions and future research prospects, summarizing the full text, it gives the suggestions for solving many of the issues caused by the local power-interest groups and puts forward the future research. Through combing the article, macroscopically and dialectically analysing the influence of local power-interest groups. Emphatically putting forward many problems because of the existence of local power-interest groups, and then putting forward four aspects of the logical framework to minimize the negative effects of local power-interest groups including optimizating the government system, strengthening local government power restriction, cultivating the enterprise external environment construction and standardizing the enterprise management. Realizing effective transformation of government functions, preventing the direct intervention of the government to the market, in the end disorganizing the power of local power-interest groups, turning the market mechanism into the circulatory system of self cultivation and self improvement. Finally, looking for "incubator" of local governments and "captive" of enterprises to seek the equilibrium, combining data from the official data and several typical enterprises to establish a long-term, comprehensive observation window in the three aspects, prospecting for future research directions and methods.