A Study On Agricultural Industry Investment Fund Governance

In this paper, we use new institutional economics and principal-agent theory, giving a new definition of governance agriculture industrial investment funds, basic on investment, finance, contracts, game theory and new institutional economics theory, from a system perspective to understand, investigation and analysis of agricultural investment fund industry, take the governance situation of the agricultural industrial investment fund as the starting point,study the governance issues of agricultural industrial investment fund governance issues, including governance structure, agency relationship, incentive and restraint mechanisms, and moral hazard problems, and provide a new perspective for people to study agricultural investment fund.To the governance issues for the agricultural industrial investment funds, this paper made the following aspects of the study. Firstl, analysis of agricultural industrial investment fund’s organizational structure, theoretical analysis the Agricultural Industrial Investment Fund the formation mechanism of the principle-agency relationship and mechanism, analyzing the characteristics of the participants’behavior, using the generalized model analysis the causes of moral hazard problem and adverse selection the problem and proposed the solution ideas. Second, through the theoretical model to study the agricultural industrial investment fund’s rent-seeking problems arising from principal-agent, through principle-agents remuneration model to analysis of the double agent of the principal-agent incentive needs, combined with practical experience of the investment fund incentive and restraint mechanisms to incentive and restraint needs of the agricultural industry investment fund, study the agricultural industrial investment fund’s dual principal-agent incentive and restraint mechanisms. Third, basic on data envelopment analysis model, established a DEA model based on the cost efficiency of the investment decision-making model, and reduce the number of decision making units of requirements. Investment decision-making model to evaluate the agricultural projects will consider both economic benefits and social benefits, and it also can effectively choose the highest comprehensive benefit project in the circumstances of less DMU. Fourth, discusses about the content and mechanism of agricultural industrial investment fund’s organizational models and organizational form, and make a comparative analysis of each. Fifth, use asymmetric evolutionary game analysis of rent-seeking problems of the fund managers and agricultural entrepreneurs in the agricultural industrial investment funds. Through analysis four Rent-seeking game situations, we analysis the evolution path of agricultural entrepreneurs’and fund managers’ rent-seeking strategies.Finally, in the context of the booming of China’s agricultural industrial investment fund, to improve the agricultural industrial investment fund governance mechanism and governance system, and ensure the healthy and rapid development of the agricultural industrial investment fund, this paper presents some policy recommendations. There are two main aspects, First, the improvement of the existing agricultural industrial investment fund governance structure, including improve contractual governance structure and build a limited partnership system; second, the optimization of the environment of agricultural industrial investment fund governance, give scope to the role of market competition to the governance of agricultural industrial investment fund, and establish sound agricultural industrial investment fund regulatory system.