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The Optimal Path Selection Of State-owned Enterprise’s Property Rights Reform In China

Posted on:2014-01-30Degree:DoctorType:Dissertation
Country:ChinaCandidate:X D ZhouFull Text:PDF
GTID:1269330425967705Subject:History of Economic Thought
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
State-owned enterprise reform is a fundamental and core one, which runs through the entire economic system reform process.The process of state-owned enterprise reform is very complicated and tough. The theoretical explorations and debates about it never end. In the reform of the state-owned enterprise, property rights system innovation-a traditional economical statement and the key to economic system reform-is not only important but also inevitable. So, this article focuses on the path selection of state-owned enterprise’s property rights reform.State-owned enterprise reforms originate from the reform and open strategy, which was proposed in the Third Plenary Session of the11th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party in1978, and gained momentum at the15th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in1997, which decided to adjust the state-owned economy strategically and explore various forms of public ownership. Finally, the direction of state-owned enterprise reform was established as creating a modern enterprise system, and building the share-holding system as the main form of property rights. This is the best path to state-owned enterprise reform, and also the optimal choice based on practice and exploration.This article studies the best path of state-owned enterprise reform through the analysis method of property rights economics and finds that different types of property ownership have significantly different system impact on efficiency.The root of the differences is that the traditional state-owned enterprise hid a higher relative cost. As the appurtenance of a nation or government, state-owned enterprise virtually established an implicit contract through identification with its workers, thus assuming unlimited responsibility. As having different property right structures compared with state-owned enterprises, non-state-owned enterprises and joint-stock companies have lower relative costs, thus obtain obvious institutional advantages or systematic advantages, and the regulatory costs for state-owned enterprises are also significantly higher than other types of enterprises. This is the property right theory basis of the share-holding system as the best path. As for the selection of reform tools, contract management, merger, closure, bankruptcy, and sale are all important options, and policy-based closure and bankruptcy is also an important tool played an irreplaceable role during the specific historical period. By following this path, the reform achieved big success. This article uses the method of sequence principal component analysis, studies the case of share-holding reform of state-owned banks, and tests conclusions stated above from one side.Therefore, it has important theoretical significance to systematically conclude and do empirical researches of the state-owned enterprises reform effectiveness, by using the method of property right economics, from the perspective of the reform path.Based on considerations above, the entire study is divided into nine chapters:Chapter1provides an overview of the basic theories and concepts used in this article, topic justification and significance, and related research from domestic and overseas.Chapter2analyzes the motivation and background of state-owned enterprise reform and states that the reform was triggered by multiple factors, and the general direction of economic system reform will inevitably require the enterprise, which is the microscopic basis for economy, to reform adaptably.Chapter3systematically summarizes the basic course of state-owned enterprise reform since1978. It is clear that the state-owned enterprise reform, especially the property rights reform, is a gradual one, and is a prompting exploration process with the breakthrough and innovation of ideas and theories. In particular, the goal to establish the socialist market economic system in the economic system reform, objectively combined the state-owned enterprises with market and efficiency, and decided the path selection of reform.Chapter4summarizes the effectiveness of the state-owned enterprise reform. This chapter uses the method of empirical analysis and proves that this reform, which lasted for more than30years, is successful, and more than success. Based on that, the reasons why the state-owned enterprise reform chose the modern enterprise system as direction, and took the share-holding system as the main choice of property rights structure, are explained. The empirical results analysis, together with the reform direction and method analysis answers the major theory question,"the choice of the optimal path"Chapter5and Chapter6are the main contents of this article. On the basis of the previous four chapters, these two chapters further analyze why the reform chose the share-holding system as the main choice, respectively from the perspective of "property rights" and "efficiency". These two chapters not only analyzes the nature(attribute) of different types of property rights, but also analyzes and compares different types of property rights, as well as the "efficiency" of corresponding enterprises. This part tries to introduce the concept of "relative cost", and designs an index system to analyze the efficiency of different enterprises. The study of these two chapters draws a basic conclusion:the more clearly the property right is defined, the lower the transaction cost is, and the higher the efficiency of property right can be. At the same time, the reason why private enterprise with single shareholder structure cannot be the main organization form of enterprise, which is because "the radius of management" and "the scale of the enterprise", is also explained in the analysis.Chapter7mainly introduces and comments on the basic situation and the effectiveness of large share-holding system reform of state-owned commercial banks. This chapter chiefly consists of two parts. Firstly, the state-owned commercial bank reform is an important part of the state-owned enterprise reform. Although there are not many state-owned banks, their possession of state-owned assets can be equaled to the non-financial state-owned enterprises. Secondly, the reform of state-owned banks is established on the reform of non-financial state-owned enterprises. These two reforms have internal logic relationship. This chapter makes a systematic empirical analysis on the reform effectiveness of five large commercial banks by using the time series analysis and the principal component analysis. Relatively, the empirical research on large state-owned bank system is deficient. Therefore, the case study in this chapter has certain originality.Combining the theoretical analysis and the empirical study conducted in former chapters, chapter8summarizes some basic ideas and policy suggestions about the state-owned enterprise reform and the economic system reform.This study not only crystallizes the author’s theoretical thinking on reform practice, but also expects to provide some references for colleagues who are concerned about the state-owned enterprise reform.
Keywords/Search Tags:State-owned enterprise reform, Property rights, Efficiency, Share-holding systern, Optimal path
PDF Full Text Request
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