On China's Legislation Under The Change Of Interest Structure

The pursuit of interests is the internal drive of human activities,and the impetus of social development.Interests promotes the development of man himself and the development of society.During the process of interests pursuit,the interest body will unavoidably be related to other bodies in particular ways.Meanwhile,the government balances and regulates this kind of social relations based on the need of society existence and development.A stable and firm social structure is thus formed,i.e.the social interests structure in this thesis.The interest structure originates from the dynamic balance created by the interest game among conflicting interest bodies.This balance is easily broken by internal unreasonable factors,causing violent conflicts among interest bodies.Therefore,the exploration of an effective integrating mechanism to tackle the social risks brought by interest conflicts has started since the emergence of interests differentiation in society.Compared to policies,ethics and religions,legislation is more procedural,certain and authoritative for the integration and guarantee of interests.When interest demands enter the field the legislation,it means that the demands are elevated to legal rights guarantee and accountability.The interest body is also elevated from the passive recipient of regulations to the active constitutor.The interest game becomes orderly competition from disordered profit fights.Interests of one party will be recognized and the interests of the other party will not be severely damaged during the process;thus,reaching a state of game balance.In addition,like the "fuse mechanism" in the financial market,legislation can draw the critical state of interest conflict and pause social risks,keeping interest game in a controllable scope and avoiding the extinction of human society due to violent interest conflicts.Therefore,law becomes the kind of interest integration mechanism that is commonly recognized and the most effective in human society.Legislation,in essence,is the process of interest game and integration at the institutional level.The conflicts caused by interests differentiation will be reflected in various ways at every step of legislation.The legislation realizes the affirmation or the negation of existing interest relationships.It is the explicitation and the regulation of relevant interest bodies.Through the formulation of right clauses,legislation guarantees the acquirement of legitimate interests;through the explicitation of duty clauses,it regulates interest bodies' game behaviors in market;through the setting of prohibitive clauses,it prevents profit-pursing activities that harm public interests.By the coordination,balance and integration of interests,legislation is able to realize the effective regulation of social resource allocation,keeping the interest allocation in a relatively balanced state and guaranteeing the orderly development of society under equal game rules.According to the historical materialism,law reflects the interests and common needs of society based on certain modes of material production.Interests not only open the door to explore social phenomenons,but also open a window to the understanding of legislation trend.The thoughts,motives and behaviors embodies in legislation all can be reasonably explained from the pursuit of self interests of certain bodies.By analyzing the relevance of China's current legislative system and changes in interests,this thesis summarizes the general rule of Chinese characteristic legislation-interest integration mechanism.China's legislative system should be a systematic platform where every party's interest bodies can equally execute their rights.It should follow the value of "justice(priority)and efficiency".By the social,democratic and scientific legislation,a four-sets complete interest integration mechanism will be built up,including: the interest coordination mechanism,the appealing mechanism,the conflict mediation mechanism and the right protection mechanism.The final focus is to realize the interest structure's integration and adjustment,dynamically reflecting China's comprehensive changes in interest structure.There are conflicts of interest in every type of societies,socialism is not an exception.In order to build a harmonious society,we need to build and perfect a set of systems which can constantly solve interest conflicts.Recently,the rapid development of market economy causes larger and deeper interest structure differentiation,and aggravates the public's psychological imbalance in interest allocation.The property rights system,"interest transport",administrative proceedings,department interest,etc.have attracted increasing attention and become hot issues.One of the most important reasons is that there is no clear definition on the connotation and the extension of public interests and personal interests in China's legislation.Certain specific persons infringe others' interests under the guise of public interests and the market.By reviewing the development of legal interest integration in China,this thesis searches the operation logic and basic features of China's legislation,analyzes new changes and new problems in current interest structure,summarizes the effective attempts our Party have made to realize interest integration in the 18 th National Congress,and find out the existing legislation deficiency in the aspect of interest integration.Based on the above rules,this thesis anticipates the future tendency in China's legislation.For the perfection of interest integration mechanism,countermeasures are proposed from the perspectives of legislation principles and institutional arrangements.Chapter one reviews different definitions of "interest" and "interest structure" in the Chinese and western academia,and discusses the theoretical foundation in this thesis.We adopt the dialectic relation between "economic base" and "superstructure" in historical materialism as our analytical and logical diagram.By referring to Marxism law thoughts and absorbing western institutional philosophy and interest law,etc.,we analyze the general relations between law and interest as well as between legislation integration and interest structure;thus,laying a solid foundation for the later discussion on the effectiveness of legislation interest integration mechanism.Chapter two adopts the social structure theory in sociology and the game equilibrium theory in economics to analyze the three steps that legislation must go through in order to realize the interest balancing.The three steps include the expression of interests,the selection of interests and the integration of interests.On the basis of this analysis,we generalize four mechanisms that legislation should focus on in the process of interest integration,i.e.,the interest coordination mechanism,the appealing mechanism,the conflict mediation mechanism and the right protection mechanism.This chapter provides theoretical evidence for the analysis of how China's legislation can improve its interest integration function.Chapter three focuses on the characteristics and processes of the three changes of the social interests structure after the foundation of People's Republic of China.It reveals the role and the function of legislation,concludes the general rules of how China's legislation influences changes of interest,and points out the weaknesses in "policy-leading legislation".This chapter investigates the operation logic of China's legislation diachronically and compares legislation's inclination of value in interest selection among different periods.Chapter four concentrates on a series of problems in the current interest changing in China,such as the solidation of classes,"the Matthew Effect",the flooding of the jungle law and the financial capital expansion,etc.In particular,we highlight the analysis of the ineffective role China's legislation has played in solving the above interests differentiation problems.Besides,we also discuss problems in the existing institution mechanisms,shedding light on the later "suit one's methods to the situation" solution.Chapter five offers suggestions on how China's legislation can realize interest integration from the principle and the operational perspectives.It examines the effective attempts that China's legislation has made in interests coordination since the 18 th National Congress and points out what should be enhanced.This chapter is the conclusion chapter of the thesis,and emphasizes the conclusion that China's legislation should be an institutional platform where interest bodies from every party can equally express appeals and conduct the fair game.