Research On The Supervision Of Public Officials'Power From The Perspective Of Preventing Corruption

Since the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China,China's anti-corruption struggle has achieved "new major achievements",and the main project of corruption governance has shifted to prevent corruption.There are some ways to prevent corruption such as to make public officials "do not want to rot" from their thought,to let public officials "can not be corrupted" with the system cage,and to do a good job of supervision so that public officials "do not dare to rot." In the new era,General Secretary Xi Jinping made many important speeches,stressing the needness of the supervision to the public officials' power.In March 2018,the "People's Republic of China Supervision Law"(hereinafter referred to as the "Supervisory Law")was promulgated and implemented.These all above indicate that supervision is very important to prevent corruption of public officials.From the perspective of preventing corruption,various supervisory factors such as supervisory subjects,supervision systems,and supervision methods can all have an impact on the supervisory effect of public officials.The dissertation focused on the elements of supervision such as supervision subject,supervision information and supervision ways to study the effectiveness of the supervision to the public officials' power in China and to study the effectiveness of prevent corruption.The specific research contents were as follows:(1)Supervision mechanism analysis.Firstly,this dissertation analyzed the mechanism of supervision between supervision subjects,supervision information and supervision ways with theory of the system dynamics.And then the basic model of each supervision subsystem was constructed.Secondly,the interaction mechanism between each supervisory subsystem was analyzed,and then the overall model of the supervisory system was constructed.Thirdly,according to the overall model of the supervisory system,the three negative feedback loops which can suppress the supervision of the public officials' power were found.(2)Supervision subject analysis.Firstly,based on the literature analysis method,the supervision subject and its classification were discussed in detail.Secondly,the dissertation analyzed the interaction between the supervisory subject and supervision effect of the public officials' power.Thirdly,the evolutionary game theory was used to analyze the behavior evolution of supervisors and public officials.The dissertation found that currently the Commission for Discipline Inspection has more effectively supervision effect on the power of public officials.Further research found that when the success rate of corruption by the supervisory body reached to a certain dynamic threshold,raising the bribe cost of public officials can quickly make them not to corrupt.(3)Supervision information analysis.Firstly,based on the current literature,the connotation and characteristics of supervision information were analyzed.Secondly,the dissertation discussed the interaction mechanism between supervision information and the supervision effect of public officials' power in detail.The dissertation found that permitted by current laws and regulations,the higher disclosure degree of supervision information,the better effect of the supervision effect.Thirdly,the dissertation constructed an evolutionary game model between the government and the public for supervision information disclosure.The dissertation found the key elements which influence the effect of the disclosure degree of supervision information.(4)Supervision ways analysis.Firstly,the dissertation analyzed the types and characteristics of the supervision methods.Secondly,the dissertation analyzed the interaction between supervision methods and the supervision effect of public officials in detail.Thirdly,using panel data from 31 provinces and autonomous regions in China from 2010 to 2017,the dissertation built a dynamic panel model to empirical research the interaction between supervision methods and the supervision effect.The result showed that by adopting appropriate supervision methods,the supervisory body can effectively strengthen the supervision of public officials' power.(5)Suggesstions that to improve the supervision effect were proposed.Based on the research conclusions of the previous chapters,the countermeasures and suggestions for further improving the supervision effect of public officials in China and preventing corruption were proposed.The innovation work of this research is as follows: Firstly,at the condition of the success rate of corruption of the Commission for Discipline Inspection and Discipline has reached to a certain dynamic threshold,improving the cost of accepting bribes(severe punishment)can make public officials be afraid of corruption.Secondly,by increasing the incentives for information disclosure,the punishment of non-openness information,reducing the cost of applying information of people,and improving the income of people applying for public information can make information be further opened.Thirdly,the current supervision methods such as Internet and TV can be more effectively to the work of supervising power of public officials.