| Innovation is the first driving force for development and the strategic support for building a modern economic system.EN is a constituent cell of the innovation driven strategy,the tenacious degree and the market degree of the vitality and vitality of the cell depend on the support of the venture capital organization(VC)and the level of the optimal allocation of resources.After VC's investment in EN,the original control structure of EN will be adjusted to a great extent.Because of the different positions and the information of the possession,they all want to protect their own interests and solve the contradictions among them.The distribution of control rights becomes the important bargaining chip of the two parties' cooperation negotiation,and the control right is highly dependent on the right of control.In the process of business performance and other state variables,the two sides have formed a continuous game pattern in the process of distribution based on the ownership of enterprise ownership,that is,different modes of control.The differences in the mode of control and the discrepancy of the subjects of the control rights often make the performance of the enterprise significantly different,and then form different configuration of the control right structure.Therefore,how does the structure of control right of high-tech start-ups come into being after the intervention of venture capital?And what kind of control structure allocation is most effective to improve entrepreneurial performance of entrepreneurial enterprises will constitute the main content of this paper.This paper is based on the following research ideas.First,on the basis of the review and analysis of the domestic and foreign research literature,the analysis framework of the entrepreneurial enterprise control right structure is built on the basis of the literature review and analysis of domestic and foreign research,and the key influencing factors of the control right structure are formed on the basis of the domestic and foreign research literature review and analysis.Exploratory analysis was carried out.Secondly,based on the theory and method of evolutionary game theory,on the basis of the relationship contract and the extended incomplete contract theory,we add the strategic target of the venture capitalist and the variable of characterizing the characteristics of the risk investment,introduce the share of the control right and the private income,and analyze the venture enterprise through the expansion of the hypothesis of the good risk of both sides.The mechanism of the choice of control right structure mode.Thirdly,as a signal(third party's verifiable observable variables)and VC and EN as the main body of the game,the dynamic allocation mechanism of the two types of control rights(residual control and specific control)of the enterprise under joint control and camera control is analyzed.Finally,this paper uses 700 real sample data and MATLAB software in the Qing Dynasty database,and carries out an empirical and numerical simulation test on the model analysis conclusions of the control structure and its configuration.The main work and innovation of this paper are as follows:1)established the theoretical analysis framework of the entrepreneurial enterprise's control structure forming "entrepreneur and investor negotiation-the choice of control right strategy--the performance of enterprise management performance-the residual control right arrangement",and extracted seven key factors affecting the formation of the control right structure of the enterprise.The analysis shows that as a complex of incomplete contracts and relational contracts,entrepreneurial enterprises are a kind of enterprises with special property rights structure and governance structure.According to the natural process of control right,this paper sets up an analysis framework for the formation of EN control right structure from the choice of control right strategy to the configuration of control power structure,that is,the theoretical analysis framework of "entrepreneur and investor negotiation-the choice of control right strategy-enterprise management performance display-residual control arrangement" is effectively made up.The inadequacy of incomplete contract theory,at the same time,based on the analysis framework of this article,the seven key factors of the formation of the control right of the venture enterprise are extracted by using the literature rationale,field investigation and factor analysis,namely,the profit of the entrepreneur,the performance of the enterprise,the investment and the cost of the venture capital,the manpower of the entrepreneur.Capital,venture capitalist's risk attitude and venture capitalist's income.2)based on evolutionary game(EG)theory and method,the evolutionary game model of entrepreneurs and venture capitalists for controlling power is constructed.On the basis of Georg Gebhardt&Klaus M.Schmidt(2006)and Jean-Etienne(2008)model,based on the perspective of relation contract and extended incomplete contract,we introduce the observable variable and third party's verifiable enterprise performance()as the signal,join the venture investor's strategic target(F)and risk investment home risk evasion degree()variable.The evolutionary game model of the entrepreneurial entrepreneurs and the venture capitalists for the control rights is analyzed.The mechanism of the learning dynamics and the repeated game of the venture capitalists and entrepreneurs under the limited rational condition is analyzed,and the evolution path of the control right allocation method with the change of the entrepreneurial process is revealed and the equilibrium is realized.Conditions.It is found that the optimal allocation of control right is the result of dynamic game between venture capitalists and entrepreneurs.There are only two kinds of optimal control right allocation methods,that is camera control and joint control.In particular,when the operating state(g)is better,the profit of the venture is higher(PI).The optimal control mode of control tends to camera control.With the increase of T,PH,B and F,the optimal control mode of control tends to be jointly controlled.To a certain extent,the conclusions of this study have corrected Aghion&Bolton(1992),Gebhard&Schmidt(2006)and Yan Zhixiong and fifang domain(2007).The joint control right arrangement is dominant in the arrangement of single control rights or the control right of the camera.It is proved that joint control or camera control is strictly superior to other controls under certain conditions.That's the way.3)a theoretical model of the dynamic allocation of specific control rights and residual control rights under two types of control structures,namely,joint control and camera control,is constructed.The share income function V of the enterprise is constructed,and the influence of the variables on the residual control and the specific control allocation under the two types of control mode is analyzed,and the analysis framework of incomplete contract is extended.The results of modeling analysis show that:(1)under the joint control model,the financing amount of EN,the cost of VC supervision and intervention and the degree of risk aversion are positive and negative relations with lambda 1 and[lambda]2 respectively;the liquidation value of EN,the income of EN,the residual claim obtained by VC and the project achievement probability of the project invested by VC are negative and positive,respectively,with lambda and[lambda]2,respectively.Relationship;the relationship between share income and lambda 1 of the enterprise needs to meet certain conditions,but it has a positive relationship with lambda 2;the private income of EN,the strategic income of VC and lambda 1 and lambda 2 need to meet certain conditions to reflect their relationship but not a simple positive or negative relationship.(2)under the scene of camera control,the relations between the variables and lambda 1 and lambda 2 are basically the same.The different configuration mechanism under the joint control mode is the influence of the parameter R(the fixed income obtained by the venture enterprise)and the G(business enterprise state),that is,the positive correlation between the R and the lambda 1,and the negative correlation between the R and the x 2.And when G satisfies certain conditions,it can reflect the change relationship between G and lambda 1 and lambda 2. |
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