Political, economic and international legal aspects of the US country of origin labeling legislation

This dissertation examines various aspects of the United States legislation mandating that retailers provide consumers with information on the national origin of their food. Essay I provides an overview of the statutory and regulatory authority governing origin requirements for food products in the U.S. Essay II uses a two-country, comparative static partial equilibrium model to simulate the ex-ante market and welfare outcomes of US country-of-origin labeling for a significant market---the US-Mexico fresh tomato trade. Mexican tomato exports decline in both price and quantity, with corresponding increases for US production and prices in all scenarios where consumers show a relative preference for US tomatoes. Mexican trade losses using low to mid-range consumer preference assumptions are between 16 and 32 percent of the value of Mexican tomato exports to the US, and 1 to 3 percent of the total value of agricultural produce exports, partially negating the market access gains resulting from NAFTA and WTO commitments. Essay III uses the recently initiated United States - Certain Country of Origin Labeling Requirements WTO dispute as a case study to examine the nature of the relationship between consumer information labeling regulatory measures and the applicable WTO provisions disciplining domestic regulation. For each relevant provision, the paper discusses a range of possible legal tests that may be applied to the US COOL measure. This set of judicial tests is also used to explore the impact of various legal outcomes on the balance of power between domestic and international regulatory authority. The case study reveals that WTO law does not categorically prohibit genuinely motivated consumer information labeling measures. The treatment of measures motivated by both consumer and producer interests (such as the US-COOL regulation), however, remains unclear. Further, given that many of the relevant legal provisions are largely untested, the legal outcome for both partially and genuinely motivated consumer choice measures is far from certain, and is equally likely to produce a finding of non-compliance with WTO obligations. In light of this uncertainty, the paper concludes by elucidating various issues critical to whether consumer information labeling policies are judged compliant with WTO obligations.