| This dissertation examines Cyrus Vance's approach to Soviet-American relations during the Carter administration by focusing on five specific situations: the SALT II negotiations completed in June 1979, the American reaction to the crisis in the Horn of Africa in late 1977 and early 1978, the normalization of relations with China it late 1978, the American response to the "discovery" of the Soviet combat brigade in Cuba in the summer and early fall 1979, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan beginning in December 1979. Vance's worldview and diplomatic priorities are identified and placed in the context of prior American strategies of containment and detente. Vance believed that his central responsibility was to preserve the security and promote the prosperity of the United States, and not to prevail over the Soviet Union in a battle for global influence or to remake the world in an American image. Vance was a realist when it came to narrowly defining national interests, was cautious and circumspect in situations that might escalate into a superpower confrontation, and was optimistic that much of the world would eventually gravitate to political and economic systems that had more in common with the United States than the Soviet Union. Yet he was also the visionary within the Carter administration who believed that the conflict between the superpowers in the 1970s was less about irreconcilable ideologies and national interests, but instead was rooted in the barriers of mistrust which had built up over the prior three decades. |
