| This dissertation explains why European Union (EU) member states actively surrender policy-making power to supranational authorities in unconventional ways. In light of the general antipathy toward giving up national sovereignty in European societies---even where "pro-Europe" sentiment thrives---why do national governments allow the creation of any new EU laws or policies whose effects they cannot keep under their general control? That EU member states would allow any sovereignty transfer to occur outside of the only legitimate mechanism extant---inter-governmental treaties, the bargains at the foundation of the EU's formal sphere---amounts to a puzzle. Focusing instead on the informal sphere, and drawing on a basic model of strategic interaction rooted in positive political economy, I argue that informal bargains struck between the EU's primary organizational actors---the European Council, European Commission, and European Parliament---have paradoxically resulted in increased integration.;In fact, in a "head to head" competition between the informal rules comprising these bargains and the formal rules of EU law, in every single instance of a contradiction between them the political actors adhere not to the formal but the informal---re-engineering the EU's constitution in the process. In light of how the EU is an ideal laboratory for testing different institutionalist hypotheses, I examine the ongoing internal competition to alter the EU rules that allocate power. Being a soft rationalist/structuralist, my theoretical approach allows for feedback loops among agents and structures, and in so doing makes an arguably novel theoretical contribution that not only endogenizes institutions, but also flies in the face of realist and intergovernmentalist theories. Where Mattli and Slaughter have shed light on informal dynamics in the legal sphere of the EU, I seek to do the same for the legislative/policy-making sphere. |
