| Since the beginning of the republic presidents and Congress have fought over control of the federal bureaucracy. Legally mandated administrative procedures are one means for gaining control over bureaucratic activities. Such procedures affect what bureaucrats must do, how they must do it, who they must pay attention to, and what they must pay attention to. In recent years students of bureaucracy have differed over what administrative procedures various political actors--Congress, the president, interest groups, and the bureaucracy itself--actually prefer, which actors had greater relative influence on the adoption of procedures, and how much these procedures actually affect bureaucratic decision-making.; This dissertation addresses the first two issues by studying the passage of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 (APA). The APA was the first comprehensive statute regulating administrative procedures, and it thereby provides a major body of evidence as to what administrative procedures were preferred by these political actors. The literature regarding the preferences of the actors for various administrative procedures is reviewed, and hypotheses about the actors' preferences are developed. Events related to development and passage of administrative procedure bills are studied, and the hypotheses evaluated.; The findings showed that support for or opposition to New Deal policies was the prime consideration for the various political actors. Legislators and interest groups who opposed the policy initiatives of Presidents Roosevelt and Truman supported legislation on administrative procedures which would limit presidential control of the bureaucracy. Legislators and interest groups who supported the policy initiatives of Roosevelt and Truman were willing to do whatever the president wanted regarding bills on administrative procedure. Executive branch officials appointed by a president loyally followed the president's leadership on administrative procedure legislation. The presidents' own views were influenced by their current and prospective political resources. Ample resources meant successful resistance to limits on presidential power; fewer resources meant greater willingness to accept limits. These findings have important implications for contemporary debates about the politics of administrative procedure, and the politics of the administrative state. |
