| John Rawls' The Law of Peoples has been criticized for advancing a theory of international justice that is at odds with his own well-known account of domestic justice. His theory places no absolute limits on socioeconomic differences between nations, and extends a surprising amount of toleration to illiberal peoples. The Law of Peoples is certainly a curious work, missing important stretches of argument for key conclusions and relying upon controversial empirical premises. This dissertation, however, attempts to vindicate some of the central features of Rawls' approach to global justice by defending two key ideas. First, most commentators have failed to appreciate Rawls' concern with legitimacy, the demand that coercive political institutions need to win the support of those subject to them. Rawls' theory is best understood, I argue, as defending a regime of international justice that would be justifiable to those under its coercive power.; Second, I defend a particular interpretation of Rawls' idea that obligations of justice (as opposed to more general moral duties) arise only when persons are bound by a 'basic structure.' What necessitates the obligations of justice is the unavoidably coercive nature of our relationships under unbidden and ineliminable social and political institutions. I argue that there are important differences between the domestic and international spheres that explain Rawls' otherwise puzzling insistence that there are no duties of distributive justice for the international realm. This is not to say that there are no moral obligations between nations, however, and I argue that Rawls' duty of assistance is more generous and demanding than most commentators take it to be.; The sum total is a moderate cosmopolitan theory of global justice rooted in liberal concern. Such an account does not demand that liberals need compromise their understanding of the universality or objectivity of liberal justice, as Rawls sometimes seems to suggest. It does, however, maintain that interventions, even when done to satisfy objective moral ends, sometimes amount to the coercive imposition of one state's or coalition's will on a people. A theory of international justice must equally worry about the legitimacy of its demands. |
