| This dissertation describes mandatory and 'voluntary' producer responsibility policy programs in the US intended to improve lifecycle environmental performance of industrial systems, especially product systems. The production and end of life management decisions for packaging are the focus of an economic model to determine the viability of such programs under voluntary action and government requirements. Simple game theory is applied to determine the willingness of consumers to participate in a refillable packaging plan, and to describe the necessary conditions, subject to incentives such as a deposit, by which producers will follow through with refillables. The payoffs to consumers and a monopolistic producer, interacting in the market alone and with the help of an intervening government, suggest that stakeholders in a packaging lifecycle can improve the benefits to society, and equalize the distribution of those benefits, when the interests of the producer and the consumers are adjusted with a tax. Using a simultaneous game to approximate anticipatory action, voluntary adjustment of refillable production occurs at greater financial expense to society as a whole, compared to when the government moves first with a tax. Finally, the producer can share the responsibility of promoting refillable packaging with consumers, by increasing consumers' willingness to pay for refillable packaging and its end of life costs, for a similar effect on the refillable packaging mix as with the tax, at slightly less adverse impact to producer profits. Acknowledging the non-financial benefits achieved by both consumers and producers in environmental stewardship of packaging, the model suggests that sharing responsibility among lifecycle players including consumers may indeed be economically preferable to mandatory or voluntary producer responsibility. |
