| Most theoretical approaches to the study of international alliances involve an assumption of effective capability aggregation: once two or more states make a diplomatic decision to form an alliance, their combined military power will be at least as strong as, if not stronger than, the sum of their individual capabilities. Yet this assumption is problematic, because numerous realist, domestic, and organizational factors can inhibit military cooperation. This dissertation argues that military coalitions face a fundamental tradeoff between political cohesion and military efficiency. Operational decisions are generally made through a political bargaining process, designed to maintain political cohesion among coalition members. However, a paradox soon emerges: to the extent that coalitions sacrifice military efficiency in order to maintain this political cohesion, they will find it increasingly difficult to achieve the military objectives of the operation. And if a coalition cannot achieve its military objective, it will not be able to achieve the political objective that sparked the formation of the coalition in the first place. Using evidence from the Gulf War, Somalia, and Bosnia, this dissertation demonstrates how this paradox can hinder the coalition's ability to realize both its military and political objectives. The conclusion examines the theoretical implications of this finding, and includes several policy recommendations for future U.S. military doctrine. |
