A New Research Of Inductive Paradox

Inductive paradox, which belongs to philosophical paradoxes, consists of Raven paradox, Grue paradox and Lottery paradox, which are called Hempel’s Paradox of Confirmation, Goodman’s Paradox and Kyburg’s Paradox respectively. This dissertation is a new attempt to resolve inductive paradox, based on summarizing and comparing with all kinds of solutions before.Inductive paradox has a strong pragmatics dimension and is closely related to cognitive subject compared with logical paradox in narrow sense, for which the good solution should accord with intuition when it’s inconsistent with our rationality at the level of solution in general. Therefore, I will question the process of reasoning by recover connotative default to protect our intuition and propose my new solution.The dissertation is divided into four chapters:The first chapter is a brief description of relationship between Inductive paradox and Inductive problem, the history of solution to Inductive paradox and my ideas, philosophical implications of Inductive paradox and standard for solution of Inductive. The latter three chapters are the same in the arrangement of structure, in order of the time they are found and the inherent logical relations which advance by degrees in the light of confirmation, choice and acceptation of hypothesis, including my ideas and solutions to Inductive paradox. To be specific, every solution has four parts. Firstly, I introduce the paradox and its process. Secondly, I respond the solutions before. Thirdly, I resolve Inductive paradoxes based on summarizing and comparing with all kinds of solutions before. In the end, I analyze how the paradoxes form again and argue for the new solution at the level of philosophy.I will consider Raven paradox, Grue paradox and Lottery paradox as the problem of "confirmation""choice" and "acceptance" of hypothesis respectively, which advance by degrees when the subject recognize. Therefore, in the new solution, I will question the process of reasoning by recover connotative default, and think the paradox are rooted in people’s misuse of induction. In the new solution of Raven paradox, I differentiate indirect confirmation in finite domain and infinite domain: The former is valid, and the latter is invalid. In the new solution of Grue paradox, I differentiate the level of predicate in the light of whether it’s dependent or independent of time in our mind:the former is projected, and the latter is not. In the new solution of Lottery paradox, I distinguish epitaxial conjunctive from conjunctive connotation:the former has inverse relationship, the later has not. Though clarifying these, the new solution protect our intuition:"Not-black and Not-Raven" does not confirm "all the ravens are black" in Raven paradox; It’s "Green", not "Grue", that should be chose to be projected in Grue paradox; The result that "conjunctive of all lotteries are not wining" is not accepted, enhancing the acceptability of the new solution.