| Since the 1990s, the Chinese government has embarked on an unprecedented reform of state-owned enterprises by dismantling the lifetime employment system. This reform has become a serious concern of the Chinese government and millions of laid-off employees because China still does not have a well-established welfare system and the employment environment remains difficult. Despite their frustration and discontent, laid-off employees (LOEs) have reacted differently to the reform measures in terms of their collective action. By identifying the factors that make their collective action possible or difficult, this study explores the following issues: Why have some laid-off employees taken action while others have not? Why have Chinese workers, like their counterparts in other transitional economies, been weak in resisting undesirable reform measures? Or despite LOEs' resistance, why has the Chinese government been able to dismantle the welfare regime without causing social and economic disorders?; Based on a survey of more than 700 laid-off employees and in-depth interviews, this study develops an interactive approach. It sees collective action as a result of a dual interaction: one is among prospective participants, and the other is between prospective participants and the target of their action. While the former determines the scale of action, the latter affects the nature and the modes of people's action. This study suggests that Chinese LOEs need to meet three conditions in order to act together. First, they should have incentive to participate in the action; second, they should know each other's preference before taking action. Third, they should have confidence in their action, given the possible costs.; These conditions explain the variation of LOEs' reactions and the nature of their resistance. First, there is fragmentation among LOEs in the sense that not all of them see collective action as the most effective means to their ends. Those with alternatives are less likely to take action. Second, LOEs face a coordination problem among themselves because they often lack a regular basis for interaction after layoff.; Third, most important, the multiple policies adopted by the government impose costs on different participants, making their action difficult. While these factors are hurdles to LOEs' action, they have not eliminated their resistance. The constraints on the government and LOEs' success in solving the coordination problem make their collective action possible. But because of their weak power, LOEs' action is within the limits set by the government and tends to be economic in nature, small-scaled, peaceful, and short-lived. Hence although there has been collective resistance, it has not sufficed to stop the reform. Yet, LOEs' resistance may become a force that makes the government institutionalize state-society interaction in China. |
