| This dissertation studies the relation between the structural transformation of the Bourbon army of colonial Guatemala, and the evolution of military justice, process of institutionalization, and political function of the military establishment, during the last decades of Spanish rule, 1762--1821. It argues that the arrival in 1770, 1777, and 1786 of Spanish regular army officers and soldiery to Guatemala and the failure of the Army of Reinforcement to rotate them at periodic intervals led over a period of 40 years to four interrelated consequences. First, Spanish regular army officers and troops brought with them comprehensive military ordinances and regulations that ultimately generated an evolution of military jurisprudence in the region. This evolution of military justice centered on the enactment and implementation of corporate privilege or fuero militar. Second, the deficiency of Spanish troop rotation forced colonial authorities and military commanders to recruit indiscriminately from the local population, while regular army officers slowly became economically and familiarly tied to Guatemalan creole society. By 1808, this reliance on local recruitment and the transplantation of regular army officers had created a colonial army powered by thoroughly American troops and led by mostly radicado regular officers. Third, the perpetual shortage of Spanish regular officers resulted in minimal military training for creole officers and caste troops and general indiscipline in all ranks of the Bourbon army. Also, the absence of experienced troops failed to indoctrinate and socialize soldiers' daily lives into the routines and conduct of the army. Hence, an institutional order for the military establishment never consolidated. Finally, the lack of regular troop reinforcement conflated military rank and wealth and created, from an imperial standpoint, an institutional identity crisis. The regular army and militia units were, for the most part, commanded by the creole aristocracy and radicado officers and powered by impoverished American troops. This dissertation suggests that, by 1808, the Americanization of the Bourbon army and the absence of popular armed revolts against crown officials in Guatemala made a fratricidal war of independence unlikely. Instead, accord among creole and peninsular radicado officers reigned political discussion. Independence from Spain was thus inevitable for Guatemala. |
