Preventing nuclear smuggling

Nuclear weapons are sought by countries and terrorist groups alike. During the Cold War, the security surrounding these weapons and materials was sufficient to prevent their theft. However, after the Cold War, a new nuclear threat emerged: smuggling nuclear materials.; This project examines the nuclear smuggling problem by focusing on three research questions: what is the scope of the problem?; what affects the level of nuclear smuggling?; and what can be done to prevent it? To determine the scope of the problem, I created a database of nuclear diversion incidents that is not only a depository of information, but also a useful tool for analysis. Chapters two and three describe the construction of the database and summarize the information contained in the 1154 diversion incidents. The application of confidence levels, combined with the design and flexibility of the database, makes it a tool that facilitates systematic evaluation of data according to a large number of factors.; After establishing the scope, I try to determine what affects the level of nuclear smuggling. This is accomplished through a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods contained in chapters four through six. Chapter four examines the nuclear smuggling literature and creates some hypotheses for what factors influence nuclear smuggling. The bivariate correlation results provide suggestive evidence that the US/Russian MPC&A program is a consistent factor affecting the level of nuclear smuggling from Russia. Chapter five evaluates the nature of MPC&A programs more generally and then examines how countries implement them according to different philosophies and constraints. The case study in Chapter six explores the dynamics surrounding nuclear smuggling at the Elektrostal Machine Building Plant. I conclude that the most common incentives for nuclear thefts at Elektrostal are economic in nature. However, MPC&A technical measures presented strong deterrents, stemmed the flow of materials and ultimately affected the level of nuclear smuggling.; What can be done to prevent nuclear smuggling? The evidence presented in this project suggests that MPC&A, when implemented properly and according to the context of the host country, is an effective impediment to the illicit diversion of nuclear materials.