| This endeavor examined how Beijing, aiming at creating an amalgamated security community across the Taiwan Straits, applied an integrative modus operandi to deal with economic-cultural issues and a coercive approach to contend with diplomatic-military aspects of the bilateral relationship from 1987 to 2000. The inception of the hitherto unknown cross-strait interactions commenced in November 1987 as a result of Taipei's policy veering, as well as Beijing's smiling diplomacy, launched in January 1979 to lure Taiwan back to the embrace of the motherland. The unprecedented phenomenon of affection-motivated family reunions, profit-driven economic activities, and reality-prompted functional collaboration prevailed across the strait in the early 1990s while deep-rooted suspicion between the two rivals never faded away. Meanwhile, having emerged as a full-fledged democratic polity, Taiwan developed a more assertive attitude in managing its relations with Beijing, who became more bellicose and strove to drive the asymmetrically small opponent into the cul-de-sac with all available means. While the heightened tension of rhetorical vilification and military intimidation dominated cross-strait relations in 1995–1996, low politics continued to strengthen the connections. This precarious status quo could not be sustained without a powerful third party to act as a balancer. On the one hand, the US would not offer Taiwan carte blanche although both shared the value of democracy. Should Taiwan unilaterally declare independence to assert its raison d'etre, the balancer would step in to offset that intention. On the other hand, Washington did not acquiesce in Beijing's ambition to brandish swords in the strait though both supported the one China principle. Should China flex its muscle to fulfill the reunification objective, the balancer would stand up to neutralize that possibility. Accordingly, China remained committed to strengthening cross-strait functional and economic ties while maintaining strong interests in promoting high-level negotiations with Taiwan. However, it would best serve Beijing's and Taipei's interests if both could find a mutually acceptable sine qua non, which reflects a genuine and balanced quid pro quo, as the basis for future negotiations on a more integrated relationship. All the aforementioned factors, taken together, constitute the general scope of this endeavor. |
