| On February 6, 1985, Ronald Reagan presented the first State of the Union address after his landslide reelection to a second term as President of the United States. Although most of the speech focussed on the his domestic agenda, the president issued a call to arms in the fight against world communism. In an emotional appeal, the charismatic leader declared, “we must not break faith with those who are risking their lives—on every continent from Afghanistan to Nicaragua—to defy Soviet-supported aggression.” He then reminded his audience that “Freedom is not the sole prerogative of a chosen few; it is the universal right of all God's children,” and invited them to work with him in “our mission (which is) to nourish and defend freedom and democracy.”; By openly calling for support of movements working to overthrow Marxist or Socialist regimes, the president elevated such groups to new importance within the United States' national security framework, asserting that, “support for freedom fighters is self-defense…” For the Reagan administration, freedom fighters were identified as anticommunist insurgencies that were working to overthrow the governments of Nicaragua, Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, and, at times, Ethiopia.; Within six months of the speech the press had dubbed these lines the “Reagan Doctrine,” a term that has endured and assumed common usage over time. Nonetheless there has been little study of the “doctrine,” either as a set of principles or as policy on specific groups of freedom fighters. This study examines the development, implementation, and consequences of, policies to “support freedom fighters” by supplying military equipment and training to groups attempting to overthrow the governments of Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, and Nicaragua. It goes beyond the traditional worlds of foreign policy practice to examine both formal and informal sources of policy and mechanisms for implementation. It examines the extent to which programs to aid freedom fighters contributed to US national security, and asks whether aid to anticommunist groups achieved the larger goal of rolling back Soviet expansionism. Finally, it assesses the impact of the Reagan Doctrine on societies and security relations within the countries and regions involved. |
