| To understand the human rights duties of foreigners in China, the dissertation develops an "interactive theory" which allocates particular kinds of human rights duties to particular kinds of actors. The proposed allocation of responsibilities is based on a number of factors--the relationship to the human rights victim, the actor's potential effectiveness, and the capacity to bear costs (including those stemming from retaliation). The theory is also interactive, i.e. it accounts for how duties change when other actors fail to act.; Applying the interactive theory, the dissertation concludes that human rights ideals will never be realized unless international institutions are empowered to enforce those ideals. The failure of such institutions to emerge is attributed to three historical factors: (1) the beginnings of the human rights movement when a fragile consensus emerged, mostly among Western nations, regarding the existence and meaning of human rights; (2) the "cold war," which undermined this fragile consensus by subjugating human rights principles to geopolitical concerns; and (3) the rise of the "third world" which interjected diverse new concerns, rendering consensus about human rights an even more elusive goal.; Applying the allocative principles of the interactive theory, the dissertation argues that individual foreign nations have a duty, where possible, to use economic leverage to help to enforce human rights. Particular attention is devoted to the United States policy of linking China's human rights record to renewal of its most favored nation trading status. The dissertation concludes that a number of reforms--principally focus, targeting, and flexibility--are necessary to enhance the effectiveness of unilateral economic pressures to further human rights objectives.; The interactive theory is also applied to argue that, because they have an extensive presence in China, multinational firms can play an important, but limited, human rights role. The dissertation contends that multinational firms should attempt to set a high standard for human rights ideals by honoring human rights in their own operations and by refusing to cooperate in the violation of human rights by others. They should not, however, be expected to "proactively" pressure the Chinese government about general human rights conditions. |
