| Although widely recognized for his contributions to U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union and Western Europe in the years immediately following World War II, George F. Kennan, during the period that he served as director of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff (1947-1950), was also deeply involved in the development of U.S. policy toward the Far East. In China, he was one of the primary architects of the State Department's policy of U.S. disengagement from involvement in the Chinese civil war. In Japan, he was the primary architect of the redirection of U.S. occupation policy away from demilitarization and toward economic and political reconstruction. Kennan had less success in his efforts to influence U.S. policy toward Korea and Indochina, but in both cases the government's neglect of his advice led to disastrous consequences: In the late summer of 1950, he was almost alone in warning against the crossing the 38th Parallel by U.S. forces in Korea, which provoked Chinese intervention in the war there; and, he was one of the first to warn against the U.S. military commitment in Southeast Asia, which ultimately led to the Vietnam War.; Kennan's strategic approach to East Asia in the late 1940s was based largely on his judgement that the mainland of Asia was not strategically important to the United States, and thus that his doctrine of containment was not applicable there. Instead, Kennan viewed Japan as the strategic center of the Far East and saw its revitalization as the cornerstone of postwar U.S. policy in the region. His ideas on how to implement this strategic framework, however, were not always consistent, well developed, or politically feasible. In addition, his calculation of the strategic balance of power in Asia was, in some respects, uncharacteristically shortsighted. Kennan was never able to reconcile his assessment that the mainland of Asia was strategically expendable with his belief that the United States could not afford to sacrifice its prestige there.; Nevertheless, many of the policies toward East Asia that Kennan personally developed and advocated--especially his focus on Japan--became key elements of Washington's overall approach to the region in the early postwar period. Moreover, even in those cases where his recommendations were rejected, subsequent events often demonstrated his prescience and the validity of his judgments. When viewed in its entirety, Kennan's record in East Asia is striking in the breadth and depth of his involvement, and in his level of success--especially for a policymaker who had virtually no expertise in Asian affairs. |
