Pakistan's quest for regional parity: Nuclear weapon proliferation and its motivations

In the early 1970s Pakistan quietly initiated efforts to develop a nuclear weapon capability. By about 1979 the existence of such a program was widely suspected. Despite opposition by the United States, Pakistan's nuclear weapon program has continued to grow since then. This dissertation asks why. Answer to this question has been sought within the framework of motivations for proliferation.;A review of the causes of global nuclear weapon proliferation (Chapter One) indicate that there are two major proliferation models. One set of factors, labeled as the technological model, sees nuclear proliferation resulting primarily from the overlap between civilian and defense nuclear technologies. A second model regards nuclear proliferation an outcome of a number of motivating factors which may be security-related, or based on domestic considerations, or may result from the need to achieve international prestige.;This study does not find technological "push" contributing in any significant way to the initiation of Pakistan's nuclear weapon program (Chapter Two). Among the three type of motivating factors specified by the second model, domestic considerations and the desire for international prestige are also considered insignificant. Among the security-related factors, the presence of an adversary with a latent nuclear weapon capability is considered a strong motivating factor for nuclear weaponization (Chapter Three). It is observed that since around the mid-1960s India was generally believed to have the capability to develop nuclear weapon. Thus, when Pakistan decided to acquire nuclear weapon capability it was apparently responding to the perceived nuclear threat from its prime adversary.;Discussing U.S. nonproliferation policy regarding Pakistan (Chapter Four), this dissertation states that reasons for the failure of these policies lay in U.S. reluctance to address Pakistan's security concerns arising out of the latter's adversary relationship with India. This study further asks why India and Pakistan themselves have been unable to reach any nonproliferation agreement (Chapter Five). A review of the two countries nuclear policies shows that Pakistan favors nonproliferation measures in South Asia if India also agreed to abide by them. But India links its nuclear policy with global nuclear proliferation. This incompatibility of the two approaches has prevented the conclusion of any nonproliferation agreement between them. Finally, this study concludes that for an American or any other international nonproliferation strategy to succeed with regard to Pakistan, the relationship between Pakistan's nuclear program and that of India must be explicitly recognized and dealt with.