| This dissertation empirically investigates three types of hybrid contractual arrangements involving patent licensing---specifically, cross-licensing, patent licensing under the existence of equity joint venture, and running royalty in patent licensing---through the lens of transaction cost economics (TCE). From an ex ante perspective, I have explored whether or not pre-contracting technological conditions, which could be correlated with contractual hazards, affect the ex ante choice between contractual arrangements. Both cross-licensing and the use of running royalty are assessed in this way. From an ex post perspective, I have examined whether each of the three hybrid arrangements enhances ex post knowledge transfer compared to knowledge transfer by simple patent licensing. Enhancement of knowledge transfer is measured by the amount of subsequent innovations as well as by the breadth of them in technological space.; Previous empirical studies of technology transfer through the TCE lens have established that hierarchical governance, including non-equity-based hybrids such as bilateral technology exchange contracts, facilitates tacit and complex knowledge transfer. They were nonetheless unable to examine diverse modes of hybrid contracts individually. This dissertation utilizes large samples of detailed licensing data, coupled with patent citation data, and employs additional analytical dimensions to achieve higher resolution in empirical tests than in previous TCE studies. The main findings are as follows: (1) Each of the three hybrid forms enhances the amount of ex post knowledge transfer in comparison with simpler forms of licensing, (2) the existence of an equity joint venture or of cross-licensing facilitates knowledge transfer in wider scope in technological space between licensing pairs, compared to the cases in simpler forms of licensing, and (3) the size of expected subsequent innovations negatively affects the use of running royalty in place of fixed royalty.; Those findings are consistent with the idea that patent licensing and its hybrids are not just permissions to use patented technologies, but also channels for knowledge transfer, where knowledge transactions create contractual hazards. Furthermore, the choice of hybrid governance can be explained by transaction cost economizing mainly along the markets---hierarchies continuum, though each hybrid has specific characteristics and consequences in coping for the contractual hazards. |
