| I explain the cross-national variation in the effectiveness of U.S. aggressive trade bargaining strategies and examine the relationship between regime type and the probability of trade war for trade disputes involving the United States. Drawing on "two-level game" theory, I develop a model to elucidate the conditions under which domestic politics supports the use of aggressive negotiation tactics. I argue that a system-level variable, the structure of trade among nations, systematically affects threat effectiveness and the probability of trade war by influencing both the level of unity among domestic interest groups and the degree of divided government in the sender of threats (the U.S.). America's sanction threats will enjoy more unified domestic support and hence be more credible when the dispute involves a country having a competitive, rather than complementary, trade relationship with the United States. Domestic unity in trade disputes with nations having competitive trade relations with the United States leads to stronger pressure for brinksmanship and the greater likelihood of trade wars with these states. Since many of these nations happen to be democracies, this results in the anomaly of democratic trade war. |
