| The three essays comprising this dissertation examine different aspects of the private provision of public goods. In Chapter 1, I examine the relationship between state and local government spending on education and the practice of 'earmarking' net lottery revenues for educational purposes. Panel data for the states and the District of Columbia for the 1984--1996 period suggest that variations in net lottery revenue per capita earmarked for education are associated nearly dollar-for-dollar with variations in state and local education spending per capita. In Chapter 2, I study a dynamic model of voluntary giving where contributors may be motivated by psychological considerations as well as the usual economic incentives. I analyze this model using the fairness equilibrium framework of Rabin (1993) and show that even in standard voluntary contribution games, them exist fairness equilibria that entail significantly more giving behavior than standard economic theory predicts. I then report on results of experiments designed to test implications of this model. Specifically, I vary the number of participants and the suggested level of giving in a standard voluntary contribution environment. I find results that are generally consistent with theoretical predictions of the fairness model, but not with conventional economic models. In Chapter 3, I present the results of an experiment designed to test a theoretical prediction of the relationship between the prize structure of a lottery and individuals' participation. Theory predicts that for a given prize, a fixed prize lottery will induce greater participation than will a lottery organized as a parimutuel. My experimental results confirm this theoretical prediction. |
