| The purpose of this study is to investigate the reasons underlying the Iranian military's inability or unwillingness to crush the Revolution of 1978-79. In this study we are mainly focusing on the Imperial Iranian Ground Force (army) and in some cases with the Imperial Iranian Air force.;This study includes a historical overview which would help us to address one of the most important issues, namely the relevance of the past. The Iranian military passed through "six crises" since the 1920s: military integration of the 1920s; military disintegration of 1941; territorial disintegration of 1945-46; political crisis of 1950-53; modernization crisis of 1960-77; and Revolution of 1978-79. The purpose of this overview is to demonstrate the central position of the military in determining the outcome of all these crisis.;The focus of this study is the Shah's pervasive system of control. His style for rule with regard to the armed forces, his control over recruitment, training, promotion, equipment, and, above all, his total control over the command system prevented the opposition from any attempt aiming at co-opting the military. Civil-military relations had always been closely monitored by the Shah. During his 37 years "rule", the Shah was able to keep the military in the sideline of Iranian politics. The army was at the center of almost all socio-economic as well as political crises, but never turned against its Commander-in-Chief.;Katharine Chorley, the author of Armies and the Art of Revolution, asserts: "Owing to the immense technical superiority of trained and fully equipped troops, it can be laid down that no revolution can be won against a modern army when that army is putting out its full strength against the insurrection.'' . . . (Author's abstract exceeds stipulated maximum length. Discontinued here with permission of author.) UMI.;Iran in Pahlavis' era, had been a society where since the 1920s the regime had been based on the army, and where repression had been the main means of ensuring the government's political control. During the Pahlavis' era, Iran had gone through many episodes which one or any combination of them could have been a sufficient ground for military intervention in politics. Defeat in wars and foreign occupation (early 1920s and 1940s), threat of territorial disintegration (1945-46), social and political upheavals (1950-53), and a high rate of socio-economic change and modernization had all been fertile grounds for military intervention to say nothing of the possible effects of successful military coups in surrounding countries (Turkey, Iraq, and Pakistan) on Iran's military establishments, and factionalism caused by the communist infiltration of the military--i.e. military organization of the Tudeh Party in the early 1950s. |
