Marketing Resistance: Explaining Choices of Violence and Nonviolence Inside Nationalist Movement

What explains variation in the use of violence and nonviolence within nationalist movements? Specifically, what leads organizations demanding independence for the same ethnic group to choose between institutional politics and protest on the one hand and terrorism and insurgency on the other?;Although violent struggles over the right to self-rule are the most prevalent violent conflicts worldwide, even the deadliest nationalist conflicts feature influential nonviolent organizations. During the decades long Sri Lankan civil war, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) engaged in a brutal armed campaign to achieve independence for the Tamil minority, while the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) committed itself to nonviolence. Similarly, while the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) contested elections and led nonviolent protests in pursuit of independence for Kosovar Albanians in Serbia, the Kosovo Liberation Army (UCK) instead took up arms for the same goal. Given the high profile violence of the LTTE and the UCK, what explains the efforts of organizations such as the TULF and the LDK?;The strategic differentiation theory explores the powerful effects of competition among organizations within the same nationalist movement, focusing especially on the critical role of social networks, public opinion, and leader perceptions in this competition. It argues that the requirements of sustaining mobilization necessarily force nationalist organizations representing the same ethnic group to compete with one another over popular support and local resources, including recruits, finances, food, shelter, and intelligence. To gain a leg up on their competitors, these organizations establish core bases of support in the form of social networks or internal blocs in the broader ethnic population. Internal blocs share common values, ideologies, and attitudes toward violence and nonviolence, and include preexisting networks such as a pro-independence community association or a revolutionary student group.;Securing the support of an internal bloc requires nationalist organizations to create unique brands to appeal to their potential supporters. Because violence and nonviolence are highly visible and individuals are unlikely to support an organization employing a strategy they disfavor, nationalist organizations are especially attuned to popular strategic preferences when crafting their brands. Thus, concern for popular support and resources causes nationalist leaders to prioritize popular preferences when making decisions about strategies.;In this sense, leaders' perceptions of internal bloc preferences mediate the effects of public opinion on nationalist mobilization. Such perceptions are critical for understanding why organizations adopt violence or nonviolence and how they implement those strategies on the ground to distinguish themselves from their movement rivals. Regarding the adoption of strategies, this theory posits that when nationalist leaders believe an internal bloc favors violence or nonviolence, organizations seeking to capture that bloc's support will adopt violence or nonviolence, respectively. Regarding the implementation of strategies, it contends that two organizations competing over the same internal bloc will outbid each other by escalating violence or nonviolence in accordance with popular preferences. In contrast, two organizations relying on different blocs with different preferences compete through counterbidding by employing opposite strategies and condemning the other's behavior.;I assess this theory by combining detailed process-tracing in a small number of nationalist movements with broad cross-national statistical analysis. Specifically, I explore the decision-making and behavior of organizations within the Irish nationalist movement in Northern Ireland from 1970--1981 and the Basque nationalist movement in Spain from 1976--1988. Across these two movements, I examine ten organizations and conduct six in-depth case studies using primary source material from English and Spanish-language sources. This includes 50 original interviews with experts and nationalist leaders, such as party founders, former military commanders, and rank-and-file ex-combatants. Sources also include archival documents from clandestine armed organizations and wholly nonviolent political parties, including confidential internal memos, reports, and meeting minutes. Following this process-tracing analysis, I probe generalizability through a statistical analysis of cross-national data from 80 countries from 1981--2015.;I find that social networks, public opinion, and leader perceptions are especially critical for explaining variation in violence and nonviolence within nationalist movements. By pointing to these important factors, this dissertation expands our understanding of the relationship between elite behavior and public opinion during civil conflicts. Additionally, by focusing on branding and differentiation, this research provides a critical foundation for understanding when and why organizations employ nonviolence in response to competition.