Cuban policy in Africa: The limits of the proxy model

This study contends that Cuban policy in Africa, which was marked by two Soviet-Cuban military interventions in Angola (1975-76) and Ethiopia (1977-78), was primarily motivated by Cuba's own foreign policy interests rather than by Soviet dictate and direction.;Employing two case studies for analysis (Angola and Ethiopia), this study seeks to demonstrate the relative autonomy of Cuban foreign policy insofar as its military presence and support to national liberation movements in Lusophone Africa predated that of the Soviet Union. At the same time, Cuba showed a record of consistency in its support for these movements whereas the Soviet Union vacillated at times.;Moreover, Fidel Castro's typical worldview and personality makeup signify the independent impulses of Cuban foreign policy. Cuba's ethnic affinity with Africans and the general level of support and goodwill it earned due to its successful civil aid programs (especially in health and education) were additional factors which exalted its status in the Third World, especially Africa.;Cuba's independent stance is noteable in the late 1980s/early 1990s, when it became prominent as a Communist nation to stand defiantly against the Soviet policies of perestroika and glasnost.;Admittedly, Cuban military success in Africa could not be possible without the Soviet military and logistic support. But an over-reliance on this variable leads to the inadequacy of the Proxy Model--heretofore used widely as an explanatory variable of Cuban foreign policy behavior in Africa.