THE DYNAMICS OF SOCIAL REGULATION: A STUDY OF THE FORMATION AND EVOLUTION OF THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION

In the 1968-70 period, the federal government engaged in a coherent wave of policy formation for the avowed purpose of protecting citizens, consumers and workers from industrial health hazards. These new regulatory agencies included the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA). A decade later, by 1981, it was possible to see an equally coherent wave of policy changes, but now in the opposite direction. These same agencies were being systematically curtailed.; The dissertation is an attempt to understand the political processes that led first to the creation of social protection and then, a mere decate later, to the reversal of the earlier policy initiative. These processes are studied especially as they manifest themselves around the historical trajectory of one of these agencies, OSHA.; The formation of OSHA and the other new regulations is found to be the result of the government's response to a prolonged legitimation crisis which happened at a time that the economy was stable enough to absorb new federal restrictions. A historical investigation reveals that the evolution of OSHA policy can be explained by subsequent changes in the economy and resultant changes in the content public opinion, in the level of organized support for regulation, and in the political strategies of powerful economic actors. By 1980, the economic crisis was very deep and a coalition of small and large firms had mounted a growing deregulatory campaign while the public support for regulatory protection had been compromised by growing economic fears. The deregulatory efforts of the Reagan Administration were made possible by these larger changes in economic and legitimation conditions in the nation.; Five empirical chapters present the research findings of OSHA's formation, evolution and social effects. Existing theories of regulation are reviewed and criticized in light of the empirical findings. A final chapter suggests an alternative theory that more accurately reflects the findings.