The Cultural Cold War Of The USIA Against Soviet Union(1953-1961)

In recent years? research of “Cultural Cold War” has increased greatly in theinternational academic field. Unlike the previous studies which focus on the impact ofpolitical, economic factors on the Cold War, the Cultural Cold War pay particular attention tothe impact of information and cultural factors on the evolution of Cold War. To explore thehistory of US-Soviet Cultural Cold War?it is easy to find that the US has adopted a numberof different agencies and departments to carry out the specific work to win the hearts andminds of men. Among these agencies, the USIA which was established in1953, has onceplayed a major role.In order to examine the specific content and nature of the US-Soviet Cultural Cold Warbetter, this paper specifically selects the USIA during the Eisenhower term (1953-1961) as themain subject. Meantime, by using historical, international political, etc. multi-disciplinaryresearch method, and also deeply interpretated the documents, this paper then explores howthe USIA implement the strategy against Soviet Union. In addation to the introduction andconclusion part, this paper divides the USIA during the Eisenhower term against Soviet UnionCultural Cold War into four parts to dicuss. They are setting, expanding, adjusting, andenlarging phases.The first chapter is the background introduction which focuses on the origins of the US-Soviet cultural Cold War, and also examines the evolution of the American foreigninformation and exchange agencies in the early postwar.On these basis, the following chapter discusses the process of establishing the USIA.Based on the re-integration of the different sectors originally belong to American foreigninformation, the newly formed USIA became the exclusive agency which is responsible forall American information activities overseas. However, it is found that the USIA has deepfears towards the worldwide cultural offensive which launched by Soviet Union in the earlydays. In addition, subjected to the US-Soviet isolated state then, the USIA did not have manychannels to expand the Cultural Cold War against Soviet Union. Therefore, VOA basicallybecame the only weapon to carry out the work.The third chapter analyzes the course of the strategy re-adjustment made by the USIAagainst Soviet Union Cultural Cold War after the US Cold War strategy changed from“liberation” to “evolution”. In order to expand the invisible influence and achieve penetrationto the Soviet Union, the USIA attempts to adopt new measures to better contact with theSoviet people. Specifically, on the one hand, through the agreement with the Soviet Union,the US is able to re-issue American Illustrated in the Soviet Union. On the other hand, the UShas also made some breakthrough in the cultural exchanges particularly in the direct personalexchanges. However, it should be stressed that the occurrence of the Hungary events in1956created a serious interference to the efforts of US Cultural Cold War expansion against SovietUnion. The fourth chapter firstly discusses the reform of VOA after the Incident of Hungary. Inview of the fact that the international community, especially the Soviet Union, accused theVOA of inciting the Hungarian outbreak, the White House senior carefully inspected theperformance of VOA in the events. Though they denied the Soviet accusations, they believethat VOA broadcast contains too much propaganda tone. In view of this, the senioradministration proposed that the tone and programs of VOA should be changed and adjusted.Apparently, this move is more for VOA. However, after discussion on this issue andcombined with the international situation, the leadership of the USA generally believe that theissue should be considered as a whole. Eventually, after repositioning, the USIA decided togive “soft sell” more space and complement it with “hard sell”to better achieve the subversionof the Soviet regime. What pleases the US now is that the Agreement on US-Soviet culturalexchange signed in1958provides significant protection to the implementation of the “softsell”.The fifth chapter mainly explores how the USIA helped plan and staff the AmericanNational Exhibiton in Moscow during1959, as well as clarify the fact that in the goodatmosphere nurtured in the exhibition, the US and Soviet Union carried out high-level talks atCamp David and the USIA take this as an opportunity to further promote the Cultural ColdWar upgrade.In the conclusion part, the reasons why the USIA gradually got the upper hand in theCultural Cold War against Soviet Union has been analyzed. Meantime, the shortcomings andlimitations of the USIA-Soviet Union Culture Cold War are also discussed.