Research On The Promotion Of China's State-Owned Enterprises Under The Influence Of Multiple Factors

State-owned enterprises play an important role in China's economic system,and the reform of state-owned enterprises is the core work of China's economic system reform.In the "three systems" reform of state-owned enterprises,the reform of personnel system is an important part of perfecting modern enterprise system.It is also the basis of strengthening operation efficiency and improving management level.It is also an important focus of corporate governance structure reform.The reform and deepening of the personnel system provide a clear direction for the employee promotion,and promotion is an effective incentive means for employees.A good promotion mechanism can effectively enhance the work enthusiasm of employees,enhance the overall efficiency of enterprises,and ultimately enhance the vitality and competitiveness of enterprises in the economic market.Therefore,the reform of promotion mechanism is a very important work to optimize the allocation of human resources in personnel reform.The core of the promotion mechanism is to grasp the factors that affect the promotion.The State Council issued the?Three Year Action Plan for the Reform of State-Owned Enterprises?in June 2020,which has clearly pointed out that the reform of state-owned enterprises should quickly move towards the market-oriented direction of modern enterprises,and further stressed that the position promotion should be comprehensive and reasonable assessment based on business performance and work performance,puts forward the "de-administration" of the managers of state-owned enterprises and the "priority of economic benefits" of enterprises.But at present,there are still some problems in state owned enterprises,such as the "political nature "of the enterprise,the "diversity" of the enterprise objectives and positions,and the clients behavior of "reducing the screening cost of the agent's work level" and "high organizational commitment to the employees with high human capital",which will lead to the fact that the performance factors do not necessarily play a very important role in the promotion,but the non-performance factors play a greater role in the promotion,forming a more complex promotion mechanism within the state-owned enterprises,ultimately affect the effect of promotion incentive,reduce the overall management level and performance output of enterprises,and reduce the allocation of enterprise resources.Therefore,focusing on the promotion mechanism of state-owned enterprises,this paper deeply analyzes the factors that affect employees'internal promotion,analyzes the different effects of the changes and interactions of these factors on the promotion of state-owned enterprises,summarizes the promotion mode of state-owned enterprises,and studies the influence of the incentive effect of the promotion mechanism on enterprises.The results of the study will make the decision-makers of state-owned enterprises see the problems existing in the internal promotion of enterprises more clearly,and understand the incentive effect of the internal promotion mechanism on employees more deeply,so as to analyze and design the evaluation index of employees promotion more pertinently,and solve the problems existing in the promotion reasonably through the formulation of relevant policies and systems,so as to realize the incentive compatibility To reduce the risk of information asymmetry and agents,and effectively promote the reform of personnel system in state-owned enterprises.Therefore,the evaluation index of employee promotion can be analyzed and designed more pertinently,and relevant policies and systems can be formulated more reasonably to solve the problems existing in promotion,achieve incentive compatibility,reduce information asymmetry and the risk of agents,and effectively promote the reform of personnel system in state-owned enterprises.Based on human capital theory,upper echelons theory,management incentive theory and principal-agent theory,this paper studies the promotion mechanism of employees in state-owned enterprises by methods of literature analysis and theoretical deduction,empirical analysis,comparative study and game theory.To be specific:Firstly,different promotion modes in state-owned enterprises are discussed in this study.Based on the content incentive theory,a grey relational degree model is built to analyze the different satisfaction of employees brought by different promotion modes so as to determine the dependent variables for subsequent studies.Secondly,the factors that influence promotion are considered.Based on human capital theory and upper echelons theory,the influence of non-performance factors on promotion is analyzed.Some demographic factors are selected and political relationship factor is constructed as independent variables in the study of position promotion.The promotion data of China Post Group Co.,Ltd.and its provincial,municipal and county branches are taken as the research object.After the data is effectively processed,the selected non-performance factors are taken as independent variables and interactive variables are designed.The factors influencing the employees' internal positions promotion are analyzed by logistic regression model.Then,from the idea of the performance variables' addition and the promotion levels' change,the dataset is changed to test the robustness of the model.Thirdly,classification algorithms of data mining such as decision tree,random forest,support vector machine and artificial neural network are used to model the promotion data and compare the accuracy of the results,so as to find the most suitable classification algorithm for promotion data,build models and summarize the position promotion patterns and characteristics of employees at different levels in state-owned enterprises based on the comprehensive effect of different factors.The summary of these patterns and characteristics also confirms the role of non-performance factors in position promotion once again.Finally,the equity and incentive problems of the promotion mechanism in state-owned enterprises are analyzed.The view that there are two promotion mechanisms in state-owned enterprises is put forward.From the perspective of employees' feelings,the method of multi-layer fuzzy comprehensive evaluation is used to verify the view.Based on promoted employees'different incentives brought by different promotion mechanisms,the promotion game model between principal and agent is constructed to study the promotion incentive,employees'performance and enterprise income in state-owned enterprises.Throughout the full study,the research conclusions and theoretical contribution can be summarized as follows:(1)In the different promotion mode of state-owned enterprises in China,position promotion is the most important one,and employees will get more incentive and satisfaction from position promotion.This conclusion provides a theoretical basis for the selection of dependent variables in the study of enterprise promotion.(2)In the internal promotion of state-owned enterprises in China,non-performance factors have an important impact on position promotion.The results are as follows:Male employees are always easier to get promotion than female employees.Gender discrimination and"promotion ceiling" of female still exist.The higher the employee's initial education level and final education level,the easier to get promotion,and compared with male employees,the education level is more important for the female employees'promotion,that is,the promotion standard of female employees is higher than that of male employees.In different levels of promotion,whether the employees'final education degree is obtained before employment has different influence on promotion.At the same time,the age of employees also plays a different role in the position promotion of different levels,which shows that the policy of "younger cadres" is implemented differently in different levels of enterprises.In terms of post years,within a certain age threshold,the longer the post years before promotion,the easier it is to get promotion,which is related to the requirement of the number of posts' years in China's current cadre policy.In terms of political resources,the stronger the employees' political resources are,the easier they are to get promotion.Compared with the highly educated employees,the role of political resources in the promotion of low educated employees is more obvious.These conclusions reveal the role of non-performance factors on employees'promotion in state-owned enterprises and provide a theoretical basis for the selection of independent variables in promotion research.At the same time,different from the external political promotion of the "top leaders" of the enterprise that was generally concerned by previous researchers,this paper focuses on different levels within the enterprise,which enriches the framework of promotion research.(3)Based on the purpose of promotion pattern generalization and induction,random forest is the most accurate algorithm when analyzing the promotion data with discrete target dimension and continuous or discrete input dimension,and for small data samples,support vector machine classification is a good choice.However,for the promotion data whose target dimension is two categories,the accuracy of artificial neural network algorithm is lower,and it is more suitable for the data whose target dimension is continuous.In addition,data mining methods can summarize some specific promotion patterns at different levels within the enterprise.These models provide a theoretical basis for the study of promotion characteristics at different levels of the enterprise.At the same time,the applicability of classification algorithm also provides new ideas for the processing and analysis of enterprise promotion data.(4)Promotion fairness not only has different incentive effect on general employees,but also has different incentive effect on employees who have been promoted.That is to say,employees who have been promoted through non-performance factors do not work as hard as those who have been promoted through performance factors.In addition,there is not only one fixed promotion standard in China's state-owned enterprises,but two main promotion mechanisms exist at the same time.Enterprises may adopt different promotion mechanisms for different employees in different situations.The two promotion mechanisms can be felt by employees,which will increase the gap of incentive effectiveness.This conclusion is an effective supplement to the research of promotion incentive in state-owned enterprises and extends the theory of promotion incentive to the employees who have been promoted.(5)Based on the zero-sum game analysis of principal-agent theory,it can be concluded that in the case of coexistence of two promotion mechanisms,if the enterprise wants to maximize its own benefits,the higher the salary and welfare provided by the enterprise to the employees after promotion is not the better.This paper holds that the salary and welfare provided by enterprises should be directly proportional to the screening cost of employees' work and the difference of promoted employees' performance under different incentives and related to the minimum performance created by employees.The conclusion provides a theoretical basis for salary setting in promotion incentive and extends the "tournament" game between promotion candidates based on performance to the game based on different promotion mechanisms between principal and promoted agent,which provides a new perspective for the research of promotion game.