Research On Moderate Supervision Of State-owned Assets Under The Background Of Mixed Ownership Reform Of State-owned Enterprises

Since the Third Plenary Session of the 18 th CPC Central Committee,the socialist market economic system with Chinese characteristics has begun to seek breakthroughs from the national policy level,the most important measure of which is to carry out the policy of deepening reform in an all-round way.And in the layout of deepening reform,the reform of state-owned enterprises is the most important,and it is the key issue that must be grasped.The mixed ownership reform,a reform plan put forward since the 1990 s,has taken a new step,and a large number of state-owned and non-state-owned enterprises have also ushered in new opportunities for development.Through the combination of state-owned assets and private capital,the mixed ownership reform not only opens up the mode of enterprise operation,but also generates new problems.In recent years,with the increase of assets reorganization,merger and acquisition projects involved in the mixed reform of state-owned enterprises,the loss of state-owned assets,corporate governance structure disorder and other phenomena are emerging in an endless stream,which pose a threat to the maintenance and appreciation of state-owned assets.In this context,the supervision of state-owned assets is in a dilemma: it has no way to deal with the supervision problems derived from the mixed reform of state-owned enterprises,and it is worried that too strict supervision will inhibit the smooth progress of the reform.Therefore,it is urgent and necessary to study the effective supervision of state-owned assets under the background of mixed reform of state-owned enterprises.This paper aims at "exploring the feasible scheme of supervision of state-owned assets under the background of mixed ownership reform",following the theoretical framework to practical basis,from theoretical analysis to empirical analysis,and finally puts forward policy recommendations.This paper fully combining theory with practice,in order to serve the state-owned enterprise regulators.Based on the knowledge of macroeconomics,finance,econometrics and mathematical statistics,combined with the previous research experience and achievements,the paper first systematically combs the concepts of state-owned assets supervision,mixed ownership reform and other related concepts,and also draws inspiration from classical economic theories such as governance theory,public interest theory,government failure theory,cost theory and puts forward the concept of moderate supervision combined with the particularity of state-owned assets supervision.On the one hand,this paper analyses the influence of mixed ownership reform on the supervision of state-owned assets,on the other hand,it analyses the necessity of supervision of state-owned assets under the background of mixed ownership reform,and combs the mechanism and logic of moderate supervision of state-owned assets.In the research,this paper combines the current situation of state-owned assets supervision and a large number of data,and uses the difference-in-differences model,Tail Va R model and normal cloud model to solve the problems of "why to implement the moderate supervision of state-owned assets","whether the current supervision of state-owned assets is moderate" and "how to apply moderate supervision to the management of state-owned assets".Among them,the study on the necessity of state-owned assets supervision chooses multi-period difference-in-differences model,setting state-owned enterprises as the experimental group and non-state-owned enterprises as the control group.The conclusion shows that the state-owned assets supervision combined with administration and marketization is effective as a whole,but the operation efficiency of state-owned assets still needs to be improved,so it is necessary to further study the appropriateness of supervision.Starting from the relationship between moderation and risk,the measurement of regulatory appropriateness takes the regulatory capital rate as the core,and calculates the regulatory capital ratio that state-owned enterprises need to hold in order to cope with risk based on Tail Va R model.The results show that 114 of the 141 sample enterprises' regulatory capital is higher than the unexpected loss of state-owned assets,which is considered to be the problem of excessive regulation,and the regulatory capital of another 15 enterprises is lower than the unexpected loss of state-owned assets,so there is insufficient regulation.Therefore,it is necessary to design a set of appropriate regulatory evaluation system to measure whether the state-owned enterprises have fulfilled the scientific and effective supervision.This paper constructs a new regulatory framework for the moderation of state-owned assets(the MOS framework),and designs an evaluation index system for the moderation of state-owned assets based on the MOS framework.The empirical research on the supervision and evaluation of the moderation of state-owned assets selects the normal cloud model method.The results show that the sample company's evaluation grade is general(grade III).The sample companies maintain a relatively balanced development in asset safety,structure and cost,but we should pay attention to the strength of government supervision.This result has passed the robustness test,which proves that the method is reasonable and can be used for reference by most state-owned enterprises.Finally,based on the above theoretical and empirical conclusions,this paper puts forward relevant policy recommendations from three perspectives of government regulators,state-owned enterprise regulators and market regulators,in order to promote the supervision of state-owned assets in China from the system to the policy,and then to the specific measures.This paper lays a solid theoretical foundation and provides operational guidance for the supervisory authorities to effectively fulfill the supervisory responsibility of state-owned assets under the mixed ownership reform.