The Reciprocity Governance Research Of Patent Alliance“Anti-Common Tragedy” In China

The patent alliance has a history of 150 years in Western countries,but it has only been born in China for more than ten years.The emergence of the patent alliance is the only way for the development of science and technology.It can circumvent the opportunistic behaviors such as “knocking-out” generated in the patent use under the “patent jungle”,reduce the transaction costs in patent use,alleviate the“anti-common tragedy” effect,promote technology results transformation,and has improved the ueing efficiency of patent.However,due to the existence of incomplete contracts,there will be“free-riding” and “knock-out” opportunistic behaviors in patent alliances,increasing the transaction costs of patent alliances,weakening the efficiency of patent alliances,and constraining the collectives action of alliance members,which led to the "anti-common tragedy" in the patent alliance,and is the second "anti-common tragedy" in the application of patented products.The existence of the patent alliance "anti-common tragedy" has seriously hindered the development of China's patent alliance,weakened the efficiency of patent products in the alliance,increased the difficulty of patent licensing,weakened the transformation of patent products,and made China's Patent Alliance Construction has fallen into a stagnant situation.In China's patent alliance,patent products have three kinds of relationships: obstacles,complementarity and sharing.Under any kind of relationship,there will be a phenomenon of “knocking-out” and “free rider”.The development of patent alliances is generally divided into four stages: formation period,growth period,maturity period and recession period.Most of China's patent alliances are in the process of establishment and growth,far from maturity.How to break through the constraints and obstacles of "free rider" and "knock-up" is the key to the maturity of China's patent alliance.The development of the theory of reciprocal economics has pointed out the direction for the advancement of the construction of patent alliances in China.In the reciprocal economy,patent alliances can implement reciprocal governance strategies,foster reciprocal awareness of alliance members,improve reciprocal behaviors of alliance members,recognize the value and significance of reciprocity,and thus strengthen the reciprocal construction of patent alliances and accelerate the transformation of the patent alliance to maturity in China.Reciprocal behavior is an extension of rational economic behavior,inhibition of opportunistic behavior,can effectively overcome the extreme self-interest of alliance members,constrain the "free rider" and "knock-out" in the patent alliance,reduce transaction costs,and enhance the alliance operational performance.In the patent alliance,there are three types of contractual relationships: the first is the contract between the patent union and the alliance members,the second is the contract between the alliance members and the alliance members,and the third is the contract between patent alliance or alliance members and licensed companies.Under the contractual incompleteness,these three types of contracts derive three types of transaction costs: the first is the transaction cost between the patent union and the alliance members,and the second is the transaction cost between the alliance members and the alliance members,and the third category is the transaction cost incurred between the patent union or alliance members and the licensed enterprise.The reciprocal governance process of the patent alliance is the process of overcoming the "free rider" and "knocking-out" opportunistic behavior,that is,the process of suppressing the three types of transaction costs,that is,the process of cultivating the competitiveness of the patent alliance and the competitiveness of the alliance members.It is the governance process of the patent alliance "anti-common tragedy".This study uses the ideas and methods of evolutionary game to analyze the mechanism of patent alliance transformation from self-interest to reciprocity,and constructs a reciprocal equilibrium mechanism of patent alliance.On this basis,under the support of reciprocity,opportunistic behavior,transaction cost,structural equation model theory,mediation effect and other theories,after a rigorous argumentation,the research model of this paper is designed,including the following four research models:reciprocity governance model of patent alliance operation performance promotion effect(basic research model),opportunistic behavior governance and transaction cost control chain multiple mediation effect model,"free rider" governance and transaction cost control chain multiple mediation effect model,"knocking-out" governance and transaction cost control chain multiple mediation effect model.Then,based on the sample data of China's filing and non-recorded patent alliances,the research model was tested respectively by SPSS18.0 and Lisrel8.7software,which reveals the micro-mechanism of “free-riding” governance and“knocking-out” governance and transaction cost control chain multi-mediation effect in the promotion mechanism of reciprocity governance in the patent alliance operation performance.It found the improvement direction of patent alliance reciprocity governance,and based on the combination of theory and practice,from the perspective of government,patent alliance,alliance members puts forward the reciprocity governance path of China's patent alliance,constructs the theoretical system of reciprocal governance of patent alliance,which provides a practical theoretical reference for the development of China's patent alliance to maturity.Based on the above analysis and research,the innovations of this research mainly include the following four aspects:First,this paper puts forward the idea of the second "anti-common tragedy" governance of the patent alliance,believes that although the patent alliance evades the "anti-common tragedy" during the "patent jungle" period,and reduces the harm of "knocking-out" and reduces transaction costs.However,due to the incompleteness of the contract,new opportunistic behaviors such as “free-riding” and“knocking-out” have been formed in the patent alliance,which has created new transaction costs and seriously hindered the smooth operation of the alliance.Therefore,the governance of the "anti-common tragedy" within the patent alliance is an important direction for the construction of China's patent alliance.Secondly,using the ideas and methods of evolutionary game to analyze the mechanism and path of the evolution of patent alliance from self-interest to reciprocity,demonstrate the existence of reciprocal patent alliance,and find that the benefit of reciprocal patent alliance is greater than the benefit of self-interested alliance,point out that the reciprocal patent alliance is an important feature of the patent alliance in the mature period,and is an important direction for the construction of China's patent alliance.Thirdly,in the promotion mechanism of the reciprocal governance of the patent alliance to the alliance performance,the “free-riding” governance and the“knocking-out” governance and the inhibition of various opportunistic behaviors have produced chain-based multiple mediation effects,which shows that the under the goal of enhancing performance of the alliance operation,we must not only play the role of reciprocal governance of the patent alliance,but also increase the governance of “free riders” and “knocks-out” and increase the control over transaction costs,thus creating more favorable conditions for the reciprocity governance function of patent alliance.Fourth,this paper find that the retaliatory strategy of “returning teeth” is necessary in the development stage of China's patent alliance,helping to maintain the stability of China's patent alliance,promoting the growth of patent alliances,and restraining the harm of “free rider” and “knocking-out” effectively.