Decision Optimization For The E-commerce Platform-oriented Online Retailing Supply Chain

With the development of e-commerce,the rapid rise of platform business impels it no longer confines to only provide an online marketplace for retailers by charging a proportional fee,but also purchases products from manufacturers directly and resells them to consumers as an e-tailer,which has been quite common in practice.Meanwhile,with the changing of market environment,supply chain members begin to re-examine their existing operation strategies and consider whether to adjust them in order to improve competitive advantage and optimize their decision-makings.Therefore,in the e-commerce environment,it is not only innovative in theory,but also of great practical value to investigate the decision-making optimization problems in the platform-oriented online retailing supply chain.In this paper,we mainly use game theory,optimization theory,supply chain management and other related theories,and develop mathematical model and numerical simulation to examine the optimization problem in the platform-oriented online retailing supply chain.The main content includes the following four parts.(1)The selling mode choice of the manufacturer is studied.In this paper,three selling modes are considered,viz.,reselling mode,agency selling mode and direct selling mode.By comparison,we obtain the equilibrium for the manufacturer and then analyze the influence of different selling modes on the profits of the retailer,the platform and the whole supply chain,respectively.The results show that for the manufacturer,the three selling modes are all likely to be the equilibrium,which is deeply related to the competition intensity,proportional fee and direct selling cost.Finally,we further investigate the equilibrium when the retailer and the platform make decisions simultaneously and in the case of Cournot competition.(2)The selling mode choice of the retailer is examined.In this paper,two selling modes are considered,viz.,agency selling mode and direct selling mode.In Bertrand competition and Cournot competition,we examine the retailer's optimal selling mode choice,while in the same selling mode,the impact of different competition forms on the retailer's profits is analyzed.Based on that,we further analyze the impact of different choices on the platform's profit.Finally,we conduct numerical examples and sensitivity analysis to illustrate how the paremeters affect the profits of the retailer and the platform.The results show that the retailer would choose agency selling mode when the direct selling cost is high,otherwise,direct selling mode is the optimal.In addition,in the agency selling mode,if the proportional fee is relatively lower or higher,the retailer will obtain more profit under Cournot competition;if the proportional fee is moderate,she prefers Bertrand competition.When the retailer chooses direct selling mode,both the retailer and the platform prefer Cournot competition.(3)The information sharing mode choice of the platform is investigated.Four information-sharing modes are considered,viz.,no information-sharing,information-sharing with the manufacturer,information-sharing with the retailer,information-sharing with both the manufacturer and the retailer.In the hybrid-format online retailing supply chain,the equilibrium of information-sharing mode selection for the platform is developed and we then analyze the impact of different information-sharing modes on the profits of the retailer,the manufacturer and the whole supply chain,respectively.The results show that the platform is always motivated to share demand information with other members,and the optimal choice of information-sharing mode is deeply related to the channel competition intensity and the proportional fee.In addition,it is always beneficial for the manufacturer and retailer to obtain the information.Compared with the no information-sharing model,the manufacturer,the retailer and the platform can all obtain Pareto improvement in the full sharing model.Finally,we further discuss the platform's information-sharing decision when the platform incurs a positive selling cost,the retailer and manufacturer form an alliance,and the retailer and platform form an alliance.(4)The cooperative mode choice of supply chain members is examined.Four game models among supply chain members are considered,viz.,the decentralized model,the manufacturer-retailer cooperative model,the manufacturer-platform cooperative model,and the retailer-platform cooperative model.In the hybrid-format online retailing supply chain,we study the cooperative motivation of supply chain members and the final equilibrium.The results show that the manufacturer is always motivated to cooperate with other members,while the retailer and the platform are not always willing to form a coalition.Furthermore,three cooperative models are all likely to be the final equilibrium,which deeply depends on the competition intensity and the proportional fee.Finally,we further examine the cooperative motivation and equilibrium in Cournot competition.