| "List governance" is an important top-level design in the process of further promoting economic and social development and promoting the gradual deepening of reform in China.It is mainly reflected in the current "power list","responsibility list",and "negative list" systems and policy forms implemented by governments and departments at all levels in China.The open and diversified governance concept of inventory governance echoes the macro strategic guidance of the modernization of the national governance system and governance capacity,which is the transformation of governance mechanisms.It provides beneficial options for the government to effectively participate in and serve the market economy and industrial development.List governance is also a key task and main project in the major strategy of promoting the construction of a government governed by law and comprehensively governing the country according to law.Currently,various institutional arrangements based on the basic concept of list governance in China have built a huge institutional potential in areas such as standardizing the boundaries of government power,clarifying the scope of market rights,and improving social power cultivation,providing new ideas for comprehensively deepening reform,deepening the construction of the rule of law,and promoting high-quality development new concepts,new solutions.In the context of comprehensively deepening reform,the government’s energy industry supervision and management system are also facing multiple transformation needs such as deeper marketization,diversification of regulatory models,and modernization of regulatory systems.The report of the 20 th National Congress of the CPC clearly put forward the strategic direction of "deepening the energy revolution" in China’s energy industry,which became the top-level design of deepening reform and development in China’s energy field in the next five to ten years.Among the four dimensions of the "energy revolution",the energy system revolution is an important prerequisite,guarantee,and foundation for other "three revolutions" and "one cooperation".The important carrier of the energy system revolution must be the improvement or even revolution of the rule-based institutional system.A reasonable and scientific institutional system constitutes the fundamental institutional guarantee and important driving force for the realization of the energy system revolution.The core issue in China’s current energy regulatory system still lies in the failure to effectively handle the relationship between government departments,markets,and industries,and to achieve an effective demarcation of the relationship among the three.For a long time,China’s energy regulatory system has been plagued by problems such as insufficient market construction,low efficiency of property rights,and lack of regulatory regulations.The fundamental problem remains that China’s energy industry has not been able to clarify the long-standing chronic problem of planning thinking.The boundary between government authorities and the industry is still vague,and the intervention of competent authorities is unfounded,borderless,and unconditional,the action space for multiple property rights entities to enter the energy industry is being squeezed against the background of ownership discrimination.Establishing a sound energy market is an important component of the construction of the national energy security system.To achieve this goal,it is necessary to establish a sound energy market system,formulate effective rules,revitalize the market economy,improve competitiveness,and require effective regulatory mechanisms.China’s energy marketization reform faces many challenges,including the lack of regulatory systems,regulatory offside,confusion between the energy industry and the market economy,and the incongruity between the energy price formation mechanism and the development of the market economy.In the process of deepening the reform,these issues in the energy industry supervision need to be addressed urgently.Only by clearly defining the power and responsibility boundaries,functions,and rights boundaries between the government and the market,industry,can the potential for energy market efficiency constrained by traditional systems be fully unleashed,and high-quality development of the energy industry be promoted.With the improvement of the national governance system and management functions,various list governance systems have become an important means to improve the boundaries of government power,clearly delineate the scope of market functions,and enhance the development of social forces.The precision-oriented list governance mechanism has gradually become a mainstream governance mechanism transformation option in the public service sector.This governance mechanism that relies more on institutions and has a more law-based government spirit not only conforms to the underlying logic of "market economy is a law-based economy",but also has obvious practical characteristics in the operational mechanism of inventory governance,making it easier to operate,simple and feasible in the specific administrative supervision process of the government on the market and industry.From the historical interpretation and development perspective of the energy revolution,incorporating the "inventory revolution" into the "energy system revolution" is necessary to further improve the governance level of the energy industry,enhance the governance capacity of the energy industry,and ensure national energy security.The involvement of the "inventory revolution" in the "energy revolution" can better solve the problems of insufficient,unclear,and unclear functions of energy authorities.Through the combination of rigid constraint systems and flexible regulatory systems,it can promote government energy authorities to further implement their responsibilities and stimulate the vitality of property rights in the traditional energy market.The establishment of the regulatory system itself is to achieve effective regulation and resolution of negative externalities in the industry and market.A basic principle of public choice theory points out that any rational person,when making choices and decisions with social significance,will be based on the maximization of personal interests.In the face of profits and losses,they will also pursue the maximum interests more than the minimum losses.On this basis,the theory also believes that the government also prefers rational economic people.In the practice of government departments carrying out regulatory activities aimed at the market or industry,due to the goal of maximizing financial benefits,or under the influence of local fiscal opportunism,political achievement opportunity,the government’s industrial authorities,especially the energy industry that has long been plagued by administrative monopolies,also have regulatory capture Regulatory failure and other issues.From the perspective of structural mechanism,the disorder arising from administrative regulation itself has led to the negative externality spillover problem of government regulatory activities.This disorder originating from regulation will further lead to the disorder of the energy industry and energy market through the transmission mechanism of negative externalities.Therefore,how to identify the negative externalities of energy regulatory activities and effectively regulate them is an important means to solve regulatory failures and standardize regulatory order.Clarifying the boundaries between energy regulatory power and property rights freedom and promoting the establishment of a power list around the limitations of energy regulatory power can help market and industry entities clarify market expectations and regulatory expectations.By publicizing the list of regulatory powers,"re-regulation" of regulatory power can be achieved,thereby avoiding regulatory capture issues that often arise in regulatory practice.The essence of regulation is reflected in reasonable intervention in market economic activities.In addition to improving industrial performance,the premise for rational construction is the fundamental adherence to the socialist market economic system and its related legal systems,because the market economic system and a series of institutional arrangements built around it are the basic institutional background and logical premise for the government to carry out industrial regulation.With the development of the market economy,it has become a consensus today to make the market a decisive factor in the process of resource allocation.The government should adopt more governance mechanisms with the characteristics of the rule of law in industrial supervision,clarify the allocation of regulatory power,in order to better coordinate with the basic laws of the market economy and comply with objective industrial structure and development laws.Whether it is a list of powers to regulate government boundaries or a negative list to release market freedom,list-based governance is an inevitable normative requirement for institutional transformation in the energy sector.In order to establish an effective inventory governance system,it is necessary to strengthen the institutional level of the inventory and enhance the scientific,reasonable,and effective content of the inventory.In the context of list-based governance,the improvement of energy regulatory authority is mainly reflected in the following processes: first,the clarification and summarization of regulatory authority are achieved,and on this basis,the institutional design of the two lists is clarified to achieve the improvement of regulatory efficiency.Introducing list-based governance in the field of energy regulation is an inevitable institutional innovation in responding to the energy revolution,promoting the construction of a modern energy system,establishing and improving a modern energy market,and further developing the administrative supervision system of China’s energy industry.Regardless of the form of the energy regulatory system,promoting and assisting the improvement of property rights efficiency in the energy industry has always been the inherent institutional rationality and value pursuit of the energy regulatory system.Taking this as a logical basis,the introduction of a list-based governance mechanism in the regulatory field also inevitably requires the institutional goal of promoting the joint improvement of property rights efficiency and regulatory efficiency in the energy industry.In order to achieve this goal,the two lists in the list governance process must achieve matching at all levels,from abstract concepts to specific rules.From the perspective of basic theoretical logic,the negative list has released relatively free capital access conditions for the energy industry,especially for non-state capital entities represented by diversified property rights structures,which to some extent has made it possible to diversify the investment capital structure for the development of the energy industry.However,relying solely on negative lists is still difficult to provide stable policy expectations for industries,especially investment property rights entities.As an industrial organization with a long-term planning system path dependence,the issue of administrative intervention in the market remains the biggest obstacle to the energy industry in the process of market-oriented energy transformation,and the improvement and matching of the regulatory power list is particularly important.Only when the power list and the negative list are matched and matched from the perspective of concept,structure,content,and rules can the regulation of negative externalities in both the market and the government be truly realized.On the one hand,regulating the market through negative lists can achieve the maintenance of competition order and industrial order;On the other hand,the maintenance of regulatory order and regulatory order can be achieved through the power list.Through the matching design of the two lists,effective regulation is achieved for both government and market dimensions,thereby achieving the fundamental goal of improving governance efficiency in the field of energy regulation.According to modern public management theory,public managers play a crucial role in safeguarding public interests,and the choice of governance mechanisms will determine the effectiveness of public affairs.In order to ensure the effective implementation of the list-based governance mechanism,supporting energy supervision and management system arrangements are crucial.Therefore,it is necessary to construct and match a tripartite participation mechanism of "government industry market" with internal and external interactions,to ensure that government intervention in industry and market actions can effectively safeguard public interests.From the perspective of the current institutional practice of list based governance in other fields in China,within the framework of the internal governance structure of our government,the governance mechanism built around the list system is mainly based on accepting the internal supervision mechanism under the hierarchical system,which is mainly reflected in the hierarchical organizational model,in which the superior government and its competent departments conduct "command execution" based on administrative subordination relationships with the subordinate government and its competent departments,as well as government affairs supervision,These internal supervision mechanisms play an important role in the field of public services.However,the supervision mechanism originating from outside government departments cannot be ignored.It can comprehensively and effectively supervise the implementation of listbased governance through various channels such as citizens,news media,nongovernmental organizations,and third-party evaluation agencies.The competent energy department of the government can take this opportunity to compare and assess the social effectiveness of the list governance process,timely collect and reflect the situation,opinions,and suggestions,timely summarize the shortcomings in management,and further improve the list content in the list governance process based on the realities of economic and social development in various regions,regularly update the information content in the governance list,forming a dynamic improvement mechanism for list governance,Improve the efficiency and institutional vitality of inventory governance.At the same time,introducing a list based governance mechanism into energy industry regulatory activities can promote a clear definition of the boundaries between government departments,industries,and trading markets,help to break away from the long-standing path dependence of the energy sector where industry and government are not separated,and ineffective markets,effectively regulate the functional operation and division of labor of government departments,and promote the efficient development of the industry within a reasonable free boundary,Expand the respective spatial scope of industrial development and industrial governance,and build an energy industry and energy market governance atmosphere in which the government and industry cooperate and jointly govern.In addition,in the process of compiling and constructing the energy industry governance list,professional institutional rationality with more political rationality,governance rationality,and market rationality has been incorporated,thereby enhancing the level of professional supervision in China’s energy regulatory activities,and providing a strong,professional,and more institutional rational institutional guarantee for achieving the country’s energy security,market safety,and healthy economic and social development.This proves the adequacy and necessity of introducing inventory governance into the governance mechanism in the field of energy regulation in China.Based on the above theory,this article will expand the following discussion:The first part mainly elaborates the background of this research.The problems existing in China’s energy regulatory system are not only the legal regulations governing the production and development of the energy industry and the relationship between supply and demand,but also the challenges of international geopolitical games,legal solutions and standardization of important resource affairs such as the state.In order to ensure the safety of national energy production and consumption,improve energy utilization efficiency and ecological environmental protection,it is necessary to comprehensively consider the interests of all parties,and achieve a fair,fair,and sustainable benefit distribution mechanism through a reasonable regulatory system.China has implemented a strong separation of government and enterprise reform in the energy industry to redefine the responsibility system of government departments,and systematically play the role of market resource allocation to adapt to the constraints of the external environment,as well as respond to and address long-standing energy problems through regulatory systems.In this chapter,the author will accurately locate the internal and external issues of China’s energy regulatory system,identify the institutional and efficiency issues that exist in China’s energy market regulation,thereby positioning the basic direction of the transformation of the energy regulatory system and mechanism,and clarify the path and value options for the transformation.The second part,along the above issues,focuses on the basic theory of inventory governance,clarifying the theoretical background and institutional rationality of energy regulatory inventory governance.There are many problems in the application of the inventory governance model in the field of energy regulation,and its essence is still the issue of how to handle the relationship between the government and the market in the field of energy,especially in the field of energy regulation.The core of deepening reform lies in correctly handling the relationship between government departments,the market,and society.Only by clearly dividing the boundaries of power and responsibility and the scope of functions can we fully unleash the potential of reform and promote economic development.With the modernization of the national governance system and capacity,various precision governance mechanisms have become an important means to further tighten the power boundaries of government departments,clearly delineate the scope of market functions,and enhance the development of social forces.In order to better carry out supervision and management work in the energy field,it is necessary to examine and define the specific connotation of refined governance in the energy field from the perspective of governance,deeply analyze the dynamic relationship between government departments,the market,and society,as well as the institutional issues existing in these three pairs of relationships,and establish a list type governance mechanism to reflect the value of refined governance,thereby determining a rigid framework for the power operation of government departments in charge,To achieve the goal of effectively regulating and reshaping the relationship between government,market,and society.The third part focuses on the empirical examination of this study,mainly exploring the theoretical changes in inventory governance and the institutional practice of energy regulatory inventory governance.The introduction of inventory governance into the field of energy regulation is a gradual process.Overall,along with the transformation of national governance systems and mechanisms,in the process of gradually shifting from government dominance to expanding the boundaries of market freedom,promoting the concept of government by law and the concept of market by law into the process of industrial governance has become an inevitable choice.The institutional practice process of inventory governance mechanism in China has also been formed,which has also laid an important path prerequisite for the introduction of inventory governance in the field of energy regulation in China.The institutional system for the allocation of "power rights" has a crucial impact on the governance performance of any country or region in the process of conducting industrial governance.The actual effectiveness of this governance performance depends on the level of rationalization of each country or region in conducting governance actions in relevant industries.Traditional countries tend to adopt a more centralized management power allocation pattern,achieving efficient governance for industries through centralized and unified management;Modern countries are more inclined to adopt a diversified and distributed power allocation pattern,and in a more rational and mature market environment,improve governance efficiency and promote social fairness and justice by incorporating the participation of more diverse subjects and governance mechanisms.This diversified and distributed industrial regulatory policy framework not only helps to improve governance capabilities for specific industries,but also allows for a more restrained and restrained administrative power to fully release the margin between the market and industry in the process of pursuing property rights efficiency,expand market boundaries,enhance the efficiency of resource allocation,and enhance the competitiveness and liquidity of the market,thereby achieving a modern transformation of governance mechanisms.At the same time,in order to fully realize the "decisive role of the market in resource allocation",the industrial authorities need to adopt stronger policies to enhance market competitiveness and liquidity,focusing the core direction of regulatory system transformation on breaking down administrative monopolies and local monopolies under local protectionism,and releasing the free circulation of energy products in the unified national market,Accurately position the entry threshold for diversified energy investment entities in the energy industry,reduce the operating costs of energy industry market entities,and promote the healthy development of the energy industry and market by improving the management mechanism of the energy industry and the energy market.The matching construction of the power list regulating regulatory power and the negative list regulating market access not only greatly improves the transparency of energy regulatory activities,but also clearly points out the free boundary between industry and market activities for multiple investors,provides investors with a fair,open,and inclusive market and institutional environment,and promotes the healthy and orderly development of the energy industry and energy market.The fourth part mainly focuses on the regulation of regulatory power,with the core content of how to construct the energy regulatory power list system.The essence of the power list system for the allocation of energy regulatory power is to effectively supervise and limit regulatory power and clarify the modesty of energy regulatory power.Therefore,in theory,the formulation of the power list should address the issue of re regulation.The regulatory power list system formulated for energy authorities reflects the legal connotation of the government’s "prohibition without authorization by law” and reflects the contraction of administrative regulatory power in the "power right" game pedigree positioning in the modern energy governance system.In this regard,it is necessary to proceed from the basic institutional rationality and essence of the regulatory power list,accurately position the power list within the regulatory system framework through a systematic,scientific and reasonable manner,and distinguish it from the negative list of market access,in order to solve the long-standing problem of the administrative substitution market in China’s energy industry.The theory of people’s sovereignty provides a theoretical basis for the construction of a list of rights governance system for administrative departments.The basic orientation of this theory is to control power and implement limited restrictions and intervention policies on the market.In the process of achieving this overall goal,the administrative power list governance system and the government information disclosure system complement each other and jointly play an important role in promoting administrative efficiency and industrial performance improvement.The list governance concept aims to promote the establishment of the credibility and certainty of government participation in market economic activities and promote the construction of a modern energy governance system.From the perspective of institutional composition,the basic structure of the power list consists of a vertical power allocation list with the coordination of central and local relations as the core content,and a horizontal power allocation list with the task allocation between various competent departments as the core content.The specific content consists of a list of various regulatory powers of the administrative body and a supporting list constructed to achieve relevant regulatory objectives.The purpose of establishing a list-based governance mechanism is to optimize the dynamic operation of energy industry supervision and management through multiple entities participating in the governance processes such as list formulation and list operation,and to promote the construction and improvement of the energy rule of law through multi-dimensional interpretation and loophole supplementation.The fifth part mainly focuses on the construction of market participation regulation system,including the negative list system for energy regulatory market access.The negative list system set up for the energy sector is essentially a study of market access issues in the field of market regulation and law in the field of energy competitiveness and is a list system under the concept of the rule of law market.In the field of energy market order regulation,the main goal is still to address supply-side structural adjustment.With the help of a negative list system,adjustments are made to the resource allocation model of the factor market,promoting the circulation and allocation of factors and resources in the energy industry as much as possible under a relatively free market mechanism,promoting the development of the energy industry,encouraging the enthusiasm of diversified investment entities to enter the industry,thereby expanding competition in the energy industry Eliminate outdated production capacity and promote efficient and sustainable development of the energy industry and economic society.As the main entry point for the structural reform of the energy supply side,the energy market governance system with a negative list as the core clearly defines the free boundaries of market players in the energy industry,providing a more open,equal,and transparent environment for multiple players to enter the energy market.The market governance mechanism represented by the negative list is not only a relatively mature institutional framework and policy tool in the process of managing the continuously open market economy in China,but also has the dual policy value of unifying the market access measure system and the industrial structure adjustment system,providing strong support for economic and social development.Clarifying the boundaries between government,industry,and market in the process of energy market regulation and energy industry regulation,and promoting the establishment of an energy regulatory list system can further limit unnecessary intervention by energy authorities in the industry and market,fully grant freedom to the market and industry,and provide institutional space and soil for full competition between the energy industry and the energy market,Let the energy industry fully unleash its comparative advantage of property rights in a competitive regulatory system.The institutional basis for establishing a regulatory power list and a negative market regulatory list in the energy sector is precisely the administrative monopoly that shapes the foundation and starting point of China’s energy industry.It is the inherent meaning of establishing a list system to liberate the market and unleash the vitality of property rights from the hands of the government.The application of inventory governance can not only enrich the national governance system,improve governance efficiency,and provide strong institutional support for national economic development. |
