Research On Innovation Of Incentive Mechanism Of Construction Safety Supervision In China

Construction safety always been one of government’s top priorities. With the change of government function, market economy enter into the new normal, and the science and technology development of the construction, appeared many new construction safety problems. Because of construction safety supervision information asymmetry, the existing mandatory government the regulation effect of construction safety supervision model is limited. And as the principal part of the responsibility of the construction safety of construction enterprise did not play the initiative of safety management.This paper used the methods of expert interview method, literature analysis method, from the legal, economic and cultural three aspects of Britain, the United States, and our country’s present situation of construction safety supervision are analyzed and summarized. On this basis, the construction safety supervision of incentive mechanism in Britain and the United States, as well as the similarities and differences of the further analysis. And through the methods of questionnaire investigation, expert interview method, the main problems of construction safety supervision incentive in our country are studied and summarized.Then on the basis of game theory, this paper combined with the construction enterprise economic characteristics, and the value orientation of the government and security as the characteristics of the different price products, constructing a dynamic game model of the safety of construction enterprises and the government, through the game analysis of construction enterprises can be stimulated the relationship between safety management and the main factors. The study found that government regulators of the less regulatory costs C, efficient regulation p is higher, the greater the probability q of the third party report, regulators regulation is invalid by the more punishment E, construction enterprises are not safe construction of the smaller probability r *, increase the initiative of construction enterprises for safe construction. When there is penalty F increase of enterprise irregularities, can to a certain extent, contributed to the construction enterprises to carry out safety construction, but in the long term effect is not ideal.Based on incentive theory, analyzes the goal, the incentive mechanism of construction safety supervision to determine the main object of incentive mechanism of China’s construction safety supervision, combined with foreign advanced experience of construction safety supervision incentive and China’s national conditions, from the legal, economic and cultural three aspects to construct the construction safety supervision incentive mechanism in our country, and the internal system that runs on incentive mechanism and external security were studied.