On The Cause, Basis And Target Of The Relative Centralization Of Administrative Penalty Power In Shanghai Municipality

Relative centralization of administrative penalty power refers to thepractice that the administrative penalty power of relevant administrativeorgans is centralized and submitted to one administrative organ forperformance. After the relative centralization of administrative penaltypower, the relevant administrative organs shall not perform theadministrative penalty power subject to the performance of oneadministrative organ. This practice has been conducted in many citiesincluding Shanghai.. Relative centralization of administrative penalty powerresults in the relative centralization of administrative law enforcementsubjects in some administrative fields and the relative isolation of suchadministrative power as administrative approval from administrativepenalty power. The relative centralization of administrative penalty power isa law system set in "The Administrative Penalty Law of the People'sRepublic of China", and has been executed for many years, yet there aresome disputes in practice. Therefore, it is very urgent and essential toresearch, from the point of view of theory, the cause, basis and target of therelative centralization of administrative penalty power and apply theresearch achievements of theory to actual work. In this dissertation, by means of studying the theoretical researchachievements concerning government administrative system both at homeand abroad, the statistic figure concerning administrative penalty andadministrative approval in this Municipality and its counterparts wascollected, and in-depth exploration was conveyed jointly with the relatedcomrades from the comprehensive departments and business departmentsincluding the Municipal Manning Office, the Municipal ConstructionCommission, the Municipal Division of Culture Supervision and Inspectionand the Municipal Administration of Industry and Commerce, and those 1comrades from the higher learning institutions including East-ChinaUniversity of Politics and Law. Through researching and studying theexisting theoretical achievements, and with combination of the author's ownwork practice, the problems that are supposed to be solved, and the existingtheoretical and practical difficulties in the relative centralization ofadministrative penalty power were preliminarily grasped and understood,and the basic idea for the research on the relative centralization ofadministrative penalty power was also determined. This dissertation tries to put forward the theoretical basis of the relativecentralization of administrative penalty power, namely, the cost analysisthinking of law economics. The disadvantage of multi-agency lawenforcement lies in the excess of imput of public cost and that of lawobservation of social masses of people. Furthermore, too muchcentralization of administrative power in certain administrative organ leadsto the "information asymmetry" between the outside and the organ itself,thus causing too much supervision cost. The wayout to solve multi-agencylaw enforcement is to merge administrative law enforcement organs bymeans of cost analysis, and obtain dual purposes of lessening social cost andthe mutual restriction of power. On the basis of conducting a practical research on the relativecentralization of administrative penalty power by using such theory as laweconomics, this dissertation tries to hold that in researching the relativecentralization of administrative penalty power, this system should be putinto the background of the research on the whole administrative system: first,making a research on the "margin of government function" and theappropriate administrative system in order to determine the long-term targetof administrative system; second, making a research on the role, functionand position-setting of the relative centralization of administrative penaltypower in the transformation of government function, and the basicorientation of the refo...